Chapter 1

Security, Development and the Securitization of Foreign Aid

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In recent years, the foreign aid industry has undergone an important shift. Whereas development workers until the late 1980s were mainly perceived – and often perceived themselves – as a rare species of internationalist idealists, the emergence of 'failed and fragile states', such as Afghanistan and Somalia, and 'new wars' in the Balkans and elsewhere contributed to the blurring of lines between the 'neat' world of development and the 'murky' field of national and international security. Although governments used development assistance throughout the Cold War to further their own interests in the context of superpower rivalry, aid workers generally agreed that these were regrettable circumstances. The end of the Cold War nurtured hopes that foreign aid would finally be free to focus solely on fighting poverty and inequality.

Such hopes, however, quickly faded with the advent of new forms of conflict, along with failing states that were unable to preserve minimal authority, and as a result hosted new forms of internationalized violence, thus becoming security risks both in their neighborhoods and far beyond their borders. Beginning with Western engagement in the Balkans, and accelerated by an ever-increasing number of UN-mandated military interventions in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, aid instruments became increasingly intertwined with complex international operations that addressed development and security simultaneously.

Recent donor discussions of fragile countries in the developing world have raised the specter of negative 'security spill-overs' and 'safe havens for terrorists' and often cite the adage 'There is no security without development and no development without security' – a claim 'repeated to the point of monotony', notes Duffield (2007: 1). Consequently, governments and international aid agencies have revised their aid strategies to reflect new security concerns and increased aid to strategic conflict-affected countries, especially ones where they have intervened militarily, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, or key allies in the fight against terrorism, for instance, Pakistan and Ethiopia. In this context, donor governments often adopt 'whole-of-government approaches' to integrate policy across departments. As a result, aid workers frequently work closely with military personnel and insurgents increasingly consider them legitimate targets for attack, rather than neutral humanitarian workers.

A significant debate has consequently emerged about the 'securitization' of Western countries' foreign aid policies. So far, this debate has mainly relied on the analysis of official speeches and policy documents. Beyond discourse, far less is known about actual consequences on foreign aid itself. This book seeks to fill that void. It looks into the consequences of a 'security lens' on the development assistance provided by the rich countries of the 'Global North' to poorer countries in the 'Global South'.

The term 'securitization' has been popularized in the study of international relations by the writings of the Copenhagen School. It is meant as a critical term for how fields hitherto unrelated to security concerns become 'securitized' by actors who attach a (typically national) security value to them. This allows them to be prioritized as urgent matters and therefore dealt with through exceptional means, bypassing regular procedures.[1] For most scholars writing in or building on this tradition, the securitization of foreign aid is analyzed as inherently problematic (for an exception, see Floyd 2011). According to this perspective, most prominently represented by Mark Duffield (2001; 2007), the new security discourse in development policy has made military interventions, often conducted in the name of the welfare of citizens of the 'target' countries, seem more legitimate and feasible. Although this is a powerful argument, empirical evidence of a real change in donor behaviour has so far remained elusive, with very few studies getting to the empirics of foreign aid practice.[2] The fact that politicians and public commentators often evoke this securitized rationale for foreign aid does not *ipso facto* mean that aid cannot still be motivated by normative concerns about inequality and wellbeing and that the degree of securitization cannot vary over time or across donor and recipient countries.

As scholars who work more on foreign and development policy than security *per se*, we are motivated by our own curiosity and the evident gap in knowledge about the extent to which foreign aid has indeed been transformed and how. What Duffield describes as the *state* of development assistance, we see as a growing but not totally hegemonic *trend*. In other words, whereas Duffield seems to believe that aid *is* completely securitized, we believe that it is *being* securitized – unevenly across time and space and with varying effects. The goal of this book is to help understand the nature, extent and impact of this trend, including the possibility that the trend has begun to reverse itself. More specifically, we are interested in *the effects that security concerns and interests of major donor countries have had on the rationales, priorities, policies and practices of their foreign aid since the end of the Cold War*.[3]

We thus use the term securitization in a way that differs from the Copenhagen School and its dominant focus on 'speech acts' that invoke a state of exception. In our view, the securitization of aid takes different forms and can be observed through changes in discourse, aid flows and institutional structures. Securitization can be said to occur, for instance, when donors increasingly justify aid in terms of national or international security, when they provide highest levels of assistance to specific countries and sectors based on security imperatives, when security actors (such as military forces) deliver significant amounts of aid, and when donor governments create new institutional units within their aid agencies or new inter-departmental coordination mechanisms based on security-related motives.

We do not start from the normative position, common in development circles, that all forms of securitization are to be condemned as a matter of principle. We believe that the promotion of some forms of security, such as human security, can be a legitimate endeavor, as can activities such as security-sector reform. We nonetheless take seriously the increasing concern among many foreign aid scholars, aid workers and others interested in the field that development goals are being sacrificed at the altar of security. This volume examines the extent to which this is taking place among different donors and in various contexts.

The Background: Rising Foreign Aid and the Increasing Relevance of Security

The rationale, modalities and organization of the foreign aid that industrialized countries – mostly of the Northern hemisphere – provide to developing countries in the Global South have undergone fundamental changes, as have other areas of international politics, since the

end of the Cold War over 20 years ago. In its ideal version, as exemplified by the Millennium Development Goals adopted by the UN in 2000 and the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, foreign aid is an undertaking in which developed and developing countries join forces to reduce poverty and inequality by working continuously to improve the impact of their collective efforts in a broad range of sectors. From 1997 to 2013, as can be seen in figure 1.1 below, total aid flows from the main donor countries from the Global North – those that belong to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) – almost doubled from a low of US$71 billion to a high of $134 billion (OECD 2015a).[4]

Figure 1.1: ODA from DAC countries, 1990-2013

Source: OECD (2015a)

Official development assistance has become a major arena in the emerging global governance architecture, beyond a mere focus on the reduction of poverty *per se*. It is generally considered an integral part of a modern, broader foreign policy that is not limited to promoting individual national interests but rather aimed at shaping the global environment.[5] At the same time, the emergence of 'new wars' (Kaldor 1999), an apparently increasing number of fragile states and 'international terrorism' have replaced the Cold War as major sources of perceived global threats, raising new, urgent security concerns in a less orderly, less structured world. Western countries have identified inadequate socio-economic development and poor governance as important factors driving civil war and state fragility in many countries. They have placed development assistance, which aims to address both of these causes, alongside military instruments in order to reduce the risk of violent conflict and state failure. Figure 1.2 illustrates the evolution in DAC aid commitments to the 'conflict, peace and security' sector. These commitments rose from less than $1 billion in 2004 (the first year for which data is available) to a peak of $3.3 billion in 2009, after which they began to fall.

Figure 1.2: DAC ODA Commitments to Conflict, Peace and Security, 2004-13

Source: OECD (2015a)

Initially, and particularly before 9/11, the debate on development and security focused on human security in violence-affected countries. Consequently, all major donor countries in Europe and North America as well as Japan reorganized their aid systems to reflect greater conflict-sensitivity, with a new emphasis on security-related impact and better coherence between development assistance and more traditional foreign and security policies.[6] However, military engagement in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and other places, as well as the threat perception of international terrorism turned the lens back to industrialized countries' 'homeland' security, including the security of armed forces deployed to 'crisis states' – thus creating a possible tension between 'their security' and 'our security' (see Duffield 2006: 28; Picard and Buss 2009). Table 1.1 illustrates the rise after 2001 of countries associated with the War on Terror as top aid recipients, notably Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other conflict-affected states such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Table 1.1: Top 15 recipients of DAC aid (with percentage of total DAC aid)

1992-93		2002-03		2012-13	
Egypt	5.4	Congo, D.R.	3.8	Afghanistan	3.5
Indonesia	3.8	China	2.9	Myanmar	2.3
China	3.5	India	2.3	Vietnam	2.1
Israel	2.7	Indonesia	2.2	India	2.0
Philippines	2.7	Pakistan	1.9	Indonesia	1.4
India	2,3	Serbia	1.9	Kenya	1.4
Ex-Yugoslavia	1.7	Egypt	1.7	Tanzania	1.3
Mozambique	1.5	Mozambique	1.7	Côte d'Ivoire	1.3
Tanzania	1.3	Iraq	1.5	Ethiopia	1.3
Bangladesh	1.3	Afghanistan	1.5	Pakistan	1.2
Pakistan	1.2	Philippines	1.5	China	1.2
Thailand	1.2	Tanzania	1.3	Mozambique	1.1
Zambia	1.1	Vietnam	1.3	Bangladesh	1.1
Morocco	1.1	Jordan	1.1	Congo, D.R.	1.0
Côte d'Ivoire	1.0	Bangladesh	1.1	West Bank/Gaza	1.0

Source: OECD (2015b: Table 32)

Nevertheless, although all donor governments routinely refer to twin rationales – reducing conflict for the sake of the people immediately affected and helping prevent the spill-over of negative consequences, such as terrorism, to donor territories – actual policies, processes and priorities in the reorientation of aid differ considerably. For example, at one point Canada strongly advocated a human security perspective, while the United States made the prevention of terrorism a major objective of its aid agenda. In the United Kingdom, organizational innovations such as the Conflict Prevention Pools stood alongside an explicit aid allocation focus on poverty reduction, while Germany invested in establishing an organizational infrastructure to support civilian conflict prevention. At the EU level, the European Commission had to reconcile its traditional development objectives with a new focus on security as laid down in the 2003 European Security Strategy.

Scholarship on Security and Development

We do not intend to conduct here a comprehensive review of the concepts of security and development and the complex relationship between the two – for that, we recommend that readers consult the valuable overview provided by Spear and Williams (2012a), the first of whom wrote the US case study in this volume. However, we do revisit some of the literature to assess the extent to which it considers the effects of this emerging relationship on foreign aid.

There is no shortage of books published in recent years that adjoin the terms 'security' and 'development' in their titles, often paired with 'nexus' or 'conflict'. For instance, McNeish and Lie's (2010) edited volume *Security and Development* adopts an anthropological/ethnographic approach to the nexus and presents several local-level case studies of its impact on local-level power structures in developing countries. Tschirgi et al.'s (2010) volume of the same name focuses on conflict prevention in specific developing countries. The chapters in Mavrotas' (2011) volume, which also shares the same title as the previous two, analyze aid donors' important security challenges and recommend ways of reducing insecurity. Carment et al.'s (2010) book, *Security, Development, and the Fragile*

State, focuses on state fragility and how to engage more effectively with fragile states. Spear and Williams' (2012b) book, *Security and Development in Global Politics,* contains two chapters devoted to aid: The first traces and denounces how, at the macro level, post-9/11 aid increasingly reflects donors' security objectives, rather than recipients' development needs (Harborne 2012), while the other chapter concentrates on aid's ability to create economic development, including in fragile and conflict-affected countries (Morrow 2012). Beswick and Jackson's (2011) *Conflict, Security and Development* explores the complex relationship between security and development, including the role of foreign aid. The World Bank's 2011 World Development Report, also titled *Conflict, Security and Development*, summarizes its central message in the following terms: '[S]trengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence' (World Bank 2011: 2). Buur et al.'s (2007) edited volume, *The Security-Development Nexus,* focuses mainly on crime and violence and the challenges of reintegrating ex-combatants from various civil wars and liberation struggles in southern Africa, while Amer et al.'s (2012) book of the same name concentrates on security in specific developing countries.

These books are primarily interested in the actual and potential impact of aid/development on security or, to a certain extent, how insecurity impedes development. With the exception of one chapter in one book (Harbone 2012), they pay very little or no attention to how the 'security turn' has affected foreign aid. In positivistic social science terminology, they treat aid as an independent variable (cause), whereas we want to look at it as a dependent one (effect). A few publications do, however, look at aid donors. For example, most chapters in Howell and Lind's (2010) book, *Civil Society Under Strain: Counter-Terrorism Policy, Civil Society and Aid Post-9/11,* focus on developing countries, but a few examine donor countries (Australia, Spain, UK and US) as well. However, as the book's title indicates, it examines the effects of new security concerns on civil society actors, not donor government aid programs. Picard and Buss (2009) analyze the new, post-September 11 realities of security and aid, but only in relation to the United States. *Development, Security, and Aid*, by Essex (2013), also focuses solely on the US, taking a more historical approach. Patrick and Brown's (2007) volume is the only book to actually examine multiple donor countries' policies. It assesses the extent to which seven Western countries' various government departments achieved policy coherence in their dealings with conflict-prone developing countries. It adopts, however, the lens of security and does not examine the policies' actual impact on foreign aid.

Beyond monographs and edited volumes, the impact of increased western security concerns on the post-Cold War foreign aid system has received attention in various academic journal articles. This literature falls broadly into two categories. One strand measures the effects of strategic foreign policy interests on aid allocation. This literature continues a tradition that reaches back to the 1980s and uses quantitative regression analysis to identify aid allocation patterns (e.g., Lebovic 1988; Hess 1989). During the Cold War, this literature concluded, strategic foreign policy as well as trade interests were important determinants of aid allocation, albeit not exclusively and with marked variation among donor countries – with the US representing both the most studied case in this literature and the classical example of a security-driven donor (see also Schraeder, Hook & Taylor 1998). Lai (2003) found that security continued to be of major relevance for US foreign aid allocations during the 1990s, although the meaning of security had changed due to the end of superpower bipolarity. For France, Rioux and Belle (2005) found that, in addition to the well-known former-colony bias, foreign aid allocations were consistently and significantly correlated with news coverage on recipient countries in the influential French daily *Le Monde*.

The second strand of articles focuses on the aid discourse of donor countries and relies on aid data only for illustrative purposes. While some consider a single donor, others

try to identify general patterns across donor countries or in the overall aid 'system'. Pratt (1999) argued that in Canada a cosmopolitan and solidarity-based ethos had been eroded in favor of realist-based strategic and self-interest considerations, including those related to national security (see also Busumtwi-Sam 2002). In his view, Canada's turn under foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy to a narrative of 'human security' was the precursor of a dangerous shift away from a focus on poverty reduction and towards a foreign aid policy in line with national interests. Studying aid policies of four major donors (the US, the EU, Japan and the UK), Woods (2005: 407) concluded that '[d]evelopment assistance which prioritizes the achievement of human development goals is at risk'. While new priorities after 9/11 led to a massive increase of aid funds earmarked to advance security, she foresaw the long-term risk of such security aid crowding out assistance meant to promote development once aid budgets were cut back to previous levels as a consequence of general budgetary pressures. In her view, enhanced donor coordination, usually considered a useful means to make aid more effective, would even aggravate that risk, at least in the case of the European Union. Woods saw the international development community on the threshold of being 'swept up into the war on terror' and human development goals at risk of being marginalized in an emerging new aid regime (Woods 2005: 409). Though that scenario has not quite played out as she feared, Woods was nonetheless the first scholar to discuss the post-9/11 securitization of aid across several donor cases.

Thede (2013) echoes some of Woods' concerns in her critical analysis of the discourse of 'policy coherence for development'. Usually considered a good thing per se, coherence, in Thede's view, has become an instrument to '[turn] aid recipients into agents of donor agendas within their own territories' – not least in the area of providing security. Likewise, Aning (2010: 8) observes 'a growing conceptual and operational shift in the official development assistance (ODA) discourse resulting in the routine subjection of ODA disbursements to the imperatives of the [war on terror].' According to Aning, this trend is confirmed by the pattern of aid allocation of major donor countries in 2003-04. His analysis includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. He also discusses changing aid discourses in Japan and Denmark. Yet Aning's broad conclusion, that the international development architecture as a whole is being overwhelmed by security concerns and the war on terror, is not exactly supported by all the data he presents. At closer inspection, some data, such as those from the United States or Canada, fit his gloomy picture rather well while other cases, such as Britain or Australia, are less obvious examples. Aning's analysis is the most comprehensive attempt to date to analyze a larger number of donors and combine allocation data with a discussion of political discourse. Like most scholars, however, he seeks a neat, coherent story and thus fails to allow for the multifaceted picture that emerges from a close inspection of cases. While this approach might be motivated by the understandable attempt to shield foreign aid against abuse, it masks a puzzle: Why are some countries less prone to securitize their aid systems than others, and what can we learn from them about conditions conducive for development assistance that serves primarily the recipients rather than the donors?

Our Contribution

To date, the debates on the security-development nexus and the risks of securitization have not yielded a general analysis of the actual effects of the securitization of foreign aid on the aid system itself. Against this background, we concentrate on the effect of the increased consideration of security concerns on donor development rationales, policies, priorities and

practices in both its allocation and programming dimensions (i.e., how much, to whom and why aid is disbursed for which sectors and what types of activities).

This edited volume addresses the topic of securitization from two different angles: donor country cases and cross-cutting perspectives. The next five chapters of this book address the securitization of aid, in its various forms and manifestations, in five of the six largest Western donors in decreasing order of aid volume (US, UK, France, Japan and Canada). We asked the authors to address a number of important questions, namely: To what extent has securitization changed the way the donor government thinks about foreign aid? How did the donor use key concepts, such as fragile states and whole-of-government approaches, to reflect new perspectives on aid? To what extent has securitization modified the distribution of aid, including higher aid flows to new priority countries? Has the donor's main bilateral aid agency been able to use security concerns to mobilize additional resources or expand the reach of its activities? Or have the new concerns contributed to an instrumentalization of foreign aid, a new justification and means for non-development actors to use aid for other purposes? In sum, to what extent – and to what effect – has the government promoted and enacted the securitization of foreign aid?

The United States, by far the world's largest bilateral aid donor, is usually considered a special case when it comes to the role security plays in its foreign aid. In chapter 2, *Joanna Spear* reminds us that US foreign aid has always been securitized in the sense that it has been used in support of geostrategic goals. The novelty that came after 9/11 was in fact the return of a past trend, the *militarization* of aid. Spear argues that the chronic bureaucratic weakness of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) made it possible, even logical, for the Department of Defense (DOD) to fill the void and implement massive aid programs with a view to support military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Spear sees a striking parallel between US efforts during the Vietnam War to ensure unity of effort across government departments and similar whole-of-government efforts made by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan during the 2000s. In each of these cases, development outcomes were doubtful and did not even serve the military purposes they were meant to fulfill in a satisfactory way.

The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) is widely considered one of the most effective and innovative bilateral aid agencies. In chapter 3, *Leni Wild* and *Samir Elhawary* examine the place of security in aid policies after 1997, when DFID was created, and find a consistent link between security and development, one that has only increased in importance since the events of 11 September 2011 and again after the election of the Coalition government in 2010. They also examine concrete aid flows, finding evidence of securitization in the UK's assistance to Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, among others, but also some opposite trends, including recent decreased expenditure in Iraq. Their analysis of the UK aid sectors and modalities identifies some signs of securitization, including emphasis on security-sector reform and experiments in civil-military cooperation, as well as an increase in security-based rhetoric used to justify rapidly growing aid budgets. They also note that most aid remains nonetheless focused on more traditional poverty reduction activities. Moreover, Wild and Elhawary argue, the UK's increased engagement in fragile states responds to a large extent to development concerns, rather than security preoccupations. They conclude with recommendations for strengthening the effectiveness of using a 'security lens' for development.

Next, in chapter 4, *Philippe Marchesin* analyzes the case of France. Based on a close reading of various policy documents and statements by politicians, he traces the growing role of security concerns in the allocation and forms of French foreign aid, especially since the mid-2000s, noting that this shift occurred later than in other donor countries. His analysis then turns to aid policy in practice, addressing the strong security component in programs in

France's priority partners in the Global South. He is more critical of France than are Wild and Elhawary of the UK, linking securitization to French self-interests that are detrimental to people in recipient countries, including through repression and severe human rights abuses.

In chapter 5, *Pedro Amakasu Raposo Carvalho* and *David M. Potter* address the case of Japan, a country frequently ignored in studies of foreign aid. Japan is also exceptional for its constitutional provision that restricts the activities of its security forces, a legacy of the World War II settlement. Carvalho and Potter trace how the government's aid agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Self-Defence Forces increasingly worked in tandem to bring together elements of security and development. They analyze the simultaneous rise of peacebuilding and human security approaches, starting in the mid-1990s, alongside increased concern with terrorism and other non-military security threats abroad, especially after 9/11. They combine an examination of overall aid flows with case studies of Japanese assistance to specific African and Asian countries, finding differing degrees of subjugation of development goals to security ones.

Chapter 6 turns to the case of Canada, another important donor that, like Japan, had made 'human security' a trademark of its international engagement during the 1990s. Yet since the mid-2000s, *Stephen Brown* argues in his analysis, it was the terminology of 'failed and fragile states' and 'whole-of-government approach' that helped the Canadian government increasingly instrumentalize its international development program and use ODA funds for non-development-related purposes. Nowhere did this become more obvious than in the case of Afghanistan, consistently one of Canada's top-three aid recipients between 2002 and 2011 and a major location of Canadian military involvement. As with the case of the US, however, the military utility of using aid for military objectives has remained doubtful and the developmental impact negative. More recently, with the departure of Canadian combat troops from Afghanistan, the securitization of Canadian aid has begun to be reversed, giving way instead to another problematic trend: commercialization.

The European Union (EU) is a major multilateral donor that in many respects operates like a bilateral donor, albeit in a unique institutional setting. Chapter 7, by *Mark Furness* and *Stefan Gänzle*, analyzes to what extent securitization has affected the foreign aid provided by this complicated foreign policy actor. Since the EU issued its first-ever security strategy in 2003, it has been a matter of debate whether that document's call for bringing the Union's external action instruments closer together could be interpreted as favoring the prioritization of one policy area (e.g., security) over others (such as development). Furness and Gänzle find that there is evidence for a certain degree of securitization of EU development policy, but that these trends should rather be understood as part of a general effort to progress towards 'coherence' across the EU's external policies. They argue that policy documents, institutional changes and instruments of external action confirm the notion that security and development became more closely interrelated in the EU's international engagement. Yet rather than a deliberate securitization agenda, they see the emergence during the 2000s of the EU as an international actor in its own right and with its own security interests as a major driving force behind these efforts to increase external policy coherence. Ironically, Furness and Gänzle conclude, the EU member states' interest in treating security as a national, rather than supranational, policy field may prevent the EU from turning into a more relevant security actor and thus prevent security interests from trumping developmental concerns.

The next three chapters address cross-cutting issues in the securitization of foreign aid, namely provincial reconstruction teams, gender and climate change. These chapters examine the impact of the securitization component of their key themes on foreign aid itself.

The nexus between security and development is most fully materialized in provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), in which civilian and military actors are meant to work together towards common goals. In chapter 8, *Jaroslav Petřík* analyzes these hybrid institutions,

which were first created in Iraq in 2002-03 and later extended to Afghanistan. He examines the impact PRTs had on the provision of aid in Afghanistan, addressing the differing experiences of various donor-led PRTs. The portrait he paints is generally a negative one. PRTs, Petřík finds, were not very effective at achieving their counterinsurgency security objectives and often hampered the provision of aid by subordinating it to military actors, who knew little about aid effectiveness, and to Western political objectives, rather than the needs of Afghans. To remedy those problems, he recommends that future PRTs be firmly under civilian control.

Chapter 9, by *Liam Swiss*, addresses the links between gender equality and security across three donor countries: Canada, Sweden and the US. Gender equality goals are usually adversely affected by securitization. Swiss's contribution examines the extent to which the three donors integrate gender concerns into security-related aid and seeks to explain the variations. Swiss finds that Sweden's record is the strongest in this area, whereas the US's record and especially Canada's are significantly weaker. He explains the differences by the prevalence of three factors: greater policy coherence between gender and security concerns, greater resources allocated specifically to gender issues and greater involvement of civil society actors.

In chapter 10, *Katie Peters* and *Leigh Mayhew* examine the impact that the climate change debate has had on the securitization of foreign aid, building on the example of the UK as a bilateral aid provider. They begin their analysis with the observation that the labelling of climate change as a security threat has proliferated since it was first discussed at the UN Security Council in 2007 upon the initiative of the UK government. Heightened prioritization of the issue was an important driver for the UK government's substantial increases in foreign aid to address climate change. Yet while climate change was increasingly framed as a matter of security in some policy circles, including the UK's foreign office, Peters and Mayhew find that this has not translated into UK development assistance spent on climate change being allocated accordingly. Despite a new cross-departmental governance mechanism for the distribution of such aid, ODA funds have continued to be guided by DFID's framing of climate change as a developmental issue. DFID's strong position as a government agency in its own right, Peters and Mayhew conclude, has served as a firewall that prevented spending from being subsumed under security objectives.

In sum, the cases and topics presented in the chapters of this volume provide a rich and multifaceted picture of how the 'new' security concerns of Western donors in the early 21st century have influenced the public discourse, the institutional administration and the allocation and programming of foreign aid. Overall, they do not seem to confirm the most severe concerns that some more alarmist voices raised rather early on (although we may never know to what extent those voices themselves had some preventive effect). It may even be the case that the tide of securitization has turned, at least for the time being. Still, some donor countries have clearly turned aid into an instrument of national or international security far more than others and various factors, including policy traditions and institutional setups, help explain those diverging outcomes. The concluding chapter discusses these factors and provides an outlook on what the future of foreign aid in an environment of securitization may hold.

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[1] The classical work of the Copenhagen School is Buzan et al. (1998). This phenomenon, it should be noted, is not new. Ancient Rome's Gabinian Law, passed in 67 BCE, gave Pompey the Great extraordinary powers, in response to an allegedly urgent (and possibly deliberately exaggerated) security threat from pirates in the Mediterranean Sea.

[2] For details, see our discussion of the literature below.

[3] In this book, we use foreign aid as a synonym of official development assistance (ODA) and its related activities. ODA is defined by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC) as 'flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent' (OECD 2013; see discussion in Brown 2012: 143-4).

[4] All figures are provided in constant US dollars (2012 prices) to enhance comparability. The abnormally high figure for 2005 is due mainly to debt forgiveness to Iraq and not new spending.

[5] For an important early contribution to this debate on 'global governance', see Commission on Global Governance (1995); for a more academic discussion, see Zürn (2003).

[6] The general thrust of these efforts is best conveyed by a number of documents adopted at the OECD/DAC, the Western donors' main coordinating body at the policy level: *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, 2001 (The DAC Guidelines); *Fragile States: Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, adopted at the DAC High Level Meeting, 3-4 April 2007; *Ensuring Fragile States Are Not Left Behind,* Summary Report – March 2009.