Abstract

This chapter analyzes trends and dynamics in Canada’s multilateral development cooperation during the 2000–10 period. It finds that Canadian funding of multilateral agencies declined as a proportion of overall foreign aid, albeit with some increases in contributions to multilateral development banks and more frequent use of multilateral organizations as conduits for bilateral aid. An analysis of the Canadian government’s approach to maternal, newborn, and child health, food security, and climate change demonstrates that the government increasingly engaged mainly when in its interest to do so, but otherwise disengaged or became a free rider. This reflected Canada’s growing instrumentalization of international fora and agencies, as well as a growing preference for selective multilateralism. The conclusion suggests ways to improve Canada’s multilateral development cooperation.

Keywords: Canada; multilateralism; development cooperation; funding; policy
Introduction

Faced with the simultaneous challenges of financial, environmental, and food crises, as well as the growing power of Southern countries, the multilateral system has not yet adapted to the emerging 21st century global development challenges—or rather the states that constitute the system have not yet taken the steps to renew it. On the contrary, Western countries’ support for multilateral development cooperation declined in the 2000s (OECD 2011, 5, 26; Picciotto 2011, 64). Multilateralism has become ‘frayed [at] the edges if not the core’ (Leipziger 2011, 17). While Canada is a relatively small player in global aid, it has traditionally been engaged within institutions and committed to the principles and practice of multilateralism. That commitment, however, has—like those of Canada’s counterparts—been declining. A closer look at the Canadian case illustrates the new shapes that multilateral development cooperation is taking.

This chapter analyzes the evolving place of multilateralism in Canada’s development cooperation, focusing primarily on the 2000–10 period. It seeks not only to identify specific trends, but also to understand the dynamics at play in three important issue areas: maternal, newborn, and child health (MNCH), food security, and climate change. Overall, it finds that Canada increasingly adopted an issue-by-issue approach to multilateralism, engaging when the government determined it was in its interest to do so, but otherwise disengaging or becoming a free rider. Though some partial exceptions exist, this reflected Canada’s growing instrumentalization of international fora and agencies, as well as a growing preference for what Tom Keating (2010, 20) calls ‘à la carte multilateralism’. Rather than strengthening multilateralism to address persistent and new challenges, Canada tended to prioritize its national interests, thereby weakening the multilateral development cooperation system and eroding its reputation as an important supporter of the system. While the shift to the prioritization of national interests coincides with global trends, in some ways the Canadian case stands in stark contrast to the American, British, and French cases, the details of which are provided below.

We begin with an overview of the evolution of Canadian funding of multilateral development agencies. We note an overall decline in allocations, especially to some United Nations (UN) institutions, and highlight recent increases in contributions to multilateral development banks and in the use of multilateral institutions as conduits for bilateral aid (as distinct from funding to the organizations themselves). The rest of the chapter consists of an analysis of the Canadian government’s actions (and inaction) in the three areas mentioned above. We selected the cases according to their priority as multilateral development issues for the Canadian government and the international community. The Canadian government provided global leadership initially via the Group of Eight (G8) on the subject of MNCH and enthusiastic support via UN agencies regarding food security—though in both cases, Canadian national interests and policy preferences generally undermined rather than strengthened multilateral development cooperation. On the third issue, the Canadian government distanced itself from concerted action on the prevention of global climate change, despite the latter being a quintessential example of a global public good requiring a multilateral response, though it provided significant multilateral funding for mitigation in developing countries. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of implications for Canadian multilateralism, as well as the means and the rationale for improved multilateral development cooperation.

This contribution helps fill a gap in current understandings of contemporary Canadian development policy. Though the decline of Canada’s support for multilateral diplomacy has been widely analyzed and documented (for instance, Keating 2010), Canadian multilateral development cooperation is vastly understudied. A recent special issue of the journal Canadian Foreign Policy on ‘Canadian Multilateralism: Past, Present, and Future’ did not include any in-depth discussion of foreign aid, let alone an article dedicated to the topic (Black and Donaghy 2010). Though multilateral assistance has been described as ‘a key aspect of Canadian development cooperation’ (Thérien 1996, 320), the most
recent scholarly examination of multilateral aid was written in 1993 (Protheroe 1996). The only two comprehensive books on Canadian foreign aid published in over a decade barely mention multilateral development cooperation at all (Audet et al. 2008; Brown 2012). The link between international politics and the Canadian government’s Muskoka Initiative on MNCH is virtually unexplored. Scholars have been assessing food (in)security since the 2007–08 international food crisis, yet examinations of Canada’s contribution to food security are at a nascent stage. Finally, Canada’s role in efforts to address climate change deserves greater attention and analysis, especially following its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011.

**Canadian Multilateral Aid**

Canada became an enthusiastic supporter of the multilateral aid system in the 1960s and 70s, but its contributions began to wane in the 80s (Morrison 1998, 20–21, 54). As demonstrated below, its real contributions to multilateral organizations, especially UN agencies, slowly declined in dollar terms and the proportion of official development assistance (ODA) it contributes to multilateral institutions fell more dramatically. During the 2000–10 period, certain trends emerged, some of which contradict the overall trend. In particular, it increased its contributions to the World Bank and regional development banks. In addition, Canada increasingly channelled funds that are designated for specific purposes in certain countries through multilateral organizations, as opposed to providing core funding to those organizations themselves. Other donor countries similarly constrained multilateral agencies’ use of their funds, but Canada did so to a significantly greater extent.

In his study of Canadian multilateral aid in the 1980s, David Protheroe (1996, 46–48) suggests a number of explanations why multilateralism holds particular appeal for Canada. Most reasons draw more directly on Canadian interests. For instance, he argues, it is advantageous for Canada, as a middle power, to participate in multilateral institutions, where it can have more influence than when discussions are made solely by large powers. Multilateralism also helps shape Canadian identity and gives the country an international profile. Some multilateral aid institutions serve Canadian regional interests as well. For example, before Canada untied its food aid in 2008, the World Food Programme (WFP) distributed Canadian agricultural surpluses, which benefitted Canadian provinces with strong farming sectors. Less self-interested motivations include a commitment to international burden-sharing and specific institutions.

More broadly speaking, multilateral aid has several advantages over bilateral assistance, including the ‘pooling of money and expertise’ and the capacity to ‘handle such inherently international problems as environmental damage and infectious diseases’ (Protheroe 1996, 26). Examples of the latter include global pandemics or outbreaks of HIV/AIDS, avian influenza, and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Multilateral assistance also allows a country to avoid dealing directly with some politically sensitive issues, such as support to the Palestinian people. Economists have argued that multilateral aid is ‘more effectively targeted to poor countries’ (Dollar and Levin 2006, 2036), helps avoid duplication, and reduces the number of actors involved in each sector in a given recipient country (Knack, Rogers, and Eubank 2010, 14). Danielle Goldfarb and Stephen Tapp have argued that multilateral aid agencies ‘can take advantage of economies of scale in research, analysis, and monitoring, requiring less attention for donor coordination’ and therefore recommended ‘shifting more aid toward multilateral agencies that have greater analytical capability and that target their aid more effectively than has CIDA [the Canadian International Development Agency] in the past’ (Goldfarb and Tapp 2006, 2, 22). The World Bank, in particular, is widely perceived as an intellectual leader possessing technical capacity. Multilateral agencies also generally adopt a longer-term perspective than bilateral donors and
help prevent the emergence of ‘aidorphans’, that is, countries that would otherwise receive very limited assistance because of bilateral donors’ lack of interest.

Nonetheless, even those who advocate a higher proportion of Canadian aid delivered through multilateral institutions recognize that CIDA and other bilateral aid agencies still have some comparative advantages. For instance, such agencies ‘can be more flexible and can more easily adjust or cancel ineffective projects’ (Goldfarb and Tapp 2006, 22). They can also fund NGOs more efficiently, rather than focusing almost exclusively on the state. Furthermore, excessive multilateralization would prevent Canada from dissenting from dominant paradigms and applying its own analysis (Campbell and Hatcher 2004, 679). It reduces the donor’s ability to direct its ODA in line with its national interests and priorities (Protheroe 1996, 26–27). It also opens the donor up to accusations of supporting institutions with poor reputations, notably some UN agencies, and controversial approaches to development, such as World Bank–sponsored structural adjustment programs, which sometimes had disastrous results.

Given the pros and cons of both approaches, no one advocates spending all Canadian ODA entirely through either bilateral or multilateral development cooperation. The main issues are therefore what mix of bilateral/multilateral aid to adopt and how strongly to support specific types of or individual multilateral institutions.

Canada has provided an annual average of about $1.1 billion in multilateral aid since 1980. As can be seen in Figure 1, the amounts vary considerably from year to year. For the 1980–2010 period, the overall trend is slightly downward. In comparison, bilateral assistance increased dramatically, especially since the early 2000s.

![Figure 1](source: OECD (2012))
As a result, the proportion of Canadian ODA provided to multilateral institutions declined more visibly during this period (see Figure 2). From a high of 41 per cent in 1983, the multilateral share of ODA reached a low of 21 per cent in 2009. Though historically a higher-than-average contributor among its fellow Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) countries, Canada fell below the DAC average of 31 per cent. Nonetheless, Canada remained one of the DAC members that contributed the highest percentage of their ODA to multilateral institutions when debt relief and support to European Union (EU) institutions are excluded (OECD 2011, 6, 25).

![Figure 2](image)

Source: OECD (2012)

Such aggregate figures, however, only paint a very general picture about changes in Canadian multilateralism. Multilateral aid can be broken down according to the types of agencies it supports or through which it flows. The main ones are the UN, the World Bank, and the regional development banks (RDBs). The Canadian government signalled in 2005 that it would be more strategic in its choice of multilateral partners, pledging to ‘focus greater support on those institutions that are most effective in promoting global governance and contributing to the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals] and review Canada’s contributions to those that are less effective’ (Canada 2005, 27). In 2009, an internal CIDA evaluation recommended increased scrutiny of multilateral agencies funded by Canada and pressure to improve their performance. It also commented on the managing of effectiveness in individual institutions, but fell short of suggesting any changes to funding levels (CIDA 2009b, 43–44). In 2011, Minister of International Cooperation Beverley J. Oda, announced that CIDA would ‘continue to support and work with multilateral organizations that are effective and efficient and aligned with our government’s policies’ (Oda 2011), rather than the previous rationale based on the agencies’ overall effectiveness. The following year, the Canadian government confirmed that funding decisions would
reflect ‘Canada’s interests and priorities’ (Canada 2012, 267). Such self-interest is antithetical to the core principle of multilateralism, whereby countries subordinate their own, more narrow interests to the collective good.

During the 2000–10 period, annual Canadian ODA to the UN fluctuated between $206 million and $342 million, down from between $400 million and $500 million per year between 1982 and 1994. Aid to the World Bank and its regional counterparts was also lower than its historical levels during the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. In the case of the World Bank, contributions fluctuated greatly. For instance, Canada contributed $635 million in 2008 but only $40 million in 2009 (see Figure 3).6

Figure 3

Canadian Multilateral ODA by Type of Agency

Source: OECD (2012)

Canadian support to individual UN agencies varied widely during this period. Though assistance to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) remained comparatively constant during the 2000s, as seen in Figure 4 below, Canada reduced its core contributions to the other two main UN recipients of its ODA, WFP (discussed in the next section) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).
Over the course of the 2000s, in contrast with Canadian contributions to the UN, ODA funding to the World Bank and the RDBs generally increased, though some years were outliers (2009 for the former and 2010 for the latter). Figure 5 illustrates how Canadian contributions to the three main regional banks evolved in the 2000s. Discounting the exceptional year of 2010, disbursements to the Asian Development Bank remained relatively steady around $45 million to 65 million per year, while ODA to the African Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank generally increased.\(^7\)
It is too early to know if growth in funding to the World Bank and the RDBs will be sustained or why it occurred (see Ingram 2011). One potential argument in favour of support to the development banks is their alleged greater effectiveness. Several recent rankings of aid donors have placed these multilateral agencies at the top of their lists (Easterly and Pフトze 2008; Knack, Rogers, and Eubank 2010). Robert Picciotto (2011, 67), a former World Bank vice president, concludes that ‘there is considerable variation in the effectiveness of multilateral agencies, but it is equally clear that most bilateral aid agencies are less effective than most multilateral agencies’. Nonetheless, Danny Leipziger (2011, 27), another former vice president of the World Bank, sees mainly deficiencies: ‘The multilateral horizon is dotted with regional development banks, the World Bank, vertical funds, and various UN agencies that in general fail to measure up well in terms of either effectiveness or impact’. The explanation might actually be one of expediency rather than principled policy. Canada has long used multilateral institutions to disburse funds rapidly, when the need arose, with a ‘minimal administrative workload’ (Morrison 1998, 54). When the government needs to meet specific spending targets before the end of the fiscal year, contributions to the development banks are an easy way to do so, be it through early disbursement of funds already allocated or one-off increased contributions.

Above and beyond those trends is Canada’s increased use of multilateral organizations as conduits for bilateral funding, that is, assistance earmarked to a specific country. For instance, CIDA approved a Cdn$100 million contribution to the World Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund for the 2007–14 period and another $69.5 million for the World Bank’s Education Quality Improvement Project in Afghanistan (CIDA 2012a, b). The OECD counts those flows as bilateral aid, but they are in fact a hybrid form, sometimes referred to as ‘multi-bi’ funding. They can be interpreted as both ‘the bilaterialization of multilateral aid’ and ‘the multilateralization of bilateral aid’ (OECD 2011, 28).
As the OECD (2011, 5) recognizes, ‘Earmarking allows donors to track results more easily, to have greater say over specific uses, and to raise the visibility of their contributions in the eyes of domestic constituencies’. This growing trend, however, has been described as ‘worrisome’ (Kindornay and Besada 2011, 38) because it increases the fragmentation of aid and reduces its effectiveness (Picciotto 2011, 62). Such ad-hoc contributions also undermine a multilateral institution’s capacity to plan ahead and allocate resources according to its mandate and its established internal processes. More fundamentally, they negate some of multilateral development cooperation’s comparative advantages and basic objectives.  

When such statistics are included in the multilateral share of ODA, overall figures increase much more rapidly over the course of the 2000s (see Bhushan and Higgins 2011). In fact, the 24 per cent of Canadian ODA channelled through multilateral agencies exceeded the 22 per cent that Canada contributed to the agencies themselves in 2009 (OECD 2011, 54). During that year, Canada made non-core ODA contributions of $238 million to the World Bank and $483 million to UN agencies, including $205 million to WFP and $109 million to UNICEF, amounts that surpassed by far Canada’s core funding to those institutions (OECD 2011, 59; compare with Figure 4 above). This suggests that Canada has not regained its former enthusiasm for multilateral aid per se, but rather sees definite advantages in selectively using some multilateral agencies to meet its own national goals and priorities, while sideling other organizations.

Having provided the overall context of Canada’s multilateral development assistance, this chapter now examines the place of multilateralism in Canada’s actions in three important development issue areas, beginning with MNCH.

**Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health**

In a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2010, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper indicated for the first time that one of his G8 priorities would be to improve maternal and child health in developing countries. The following month, CIDA Minister Oda said that the government had considered the issue for a long time as it fit with CIDA’s priority themes of children and youth, and food security, experience, and the interests of nongovernmental organizations and other G8 countries (Berthiaume 2010). As host of the Muskoka G8 Summit in June 2010, the Canadian government announced the Muskoka Initiative on MNCH, which aims to generate $5 billion in new spending for the years 2010–15, with the hope of ultimately mobilizing more than $10 billion (G8 2010, 3). MNCH issues had already been a global priority for UN members and international organizations for a decade since the adoption of the MDGs in 2000. The Initiative relates directly to two of the eight goals: reducing child mortality (MDG 4) and improving maternal health (MDG 5). Canada argued for a focus on MNCH issues based the fact that progress on the two goals was ‘unacceptably slow’ and they were the ones least likely to be achieved by 2015 (G8 2010, 2).

Though the Initiative appears at first glance to be a good example of relatively selfless Canadian multilateralism, further examination suggests that Canada relaunched a UN initiative and instrumentalized a forum to implement its policy preferences for reasons of self-interest, with only limited results. When compared to the Toronto Group of Twenty Summit, at which the only successful Canadian initiative was to block an international bank tax, the G8 provided Canada with a platform to accelerate progress on two MDGs in particular and development more generally. As the leader of the Initiative, Canada committed $1.1 billion in new funding and renewed existing funding of $1.75 billion for a total commitment of $2.85 billion by 2015 (Christie 2010, 143–44). The country, however, is not the first to champion MNCH issues. UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and governments in low-income countries have been working on MNCH for decades (Caplan 2010). In 2009, British Prime
Minister Gordon Brown and World Bank President Robert Zoellick held a major event at the UN General Assembly that generated pledges of more than $5 billion to a new global Consensus for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, which set out a ten-point action plan (Berthiaume 2010). Moreover, countries such as the Netherlands and Norway had previously pledged hundreds of millions of dollars to address MNCH issues in developing countries (Berthiaume 2010). Some observers argue that, if anything, the Muskoka Initiative ‘highlights the complete abandonment of past promises’ made by G8 countries at summits, specifically those regarding financial assistance to Africa (McMillan and Besada 2010). Still, the political profile of the G8 led to increased prominence of MNCH issues. The Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the United Nations Foundation committed $2.3 billion to the Initiative, which received endorsements from other donor countries, African leaders, private foundations, the World Health Organization, and other leading health organizations (Christie 2010, 144). While this context shows that Canada chose an emotive initiative that could garner substantial support, the Canadian government was acting more as a facilitator and a policy taker than a policy innovator.

Unlike most donor countries, Canada has fulfilled its commitment to fund the Initiative. While distinct OECD data on MNCH does not exist, the G8 Research Group (2011, 42–44) has documented how only Canada and Germany allocated the full funding they pledged to specific MNCH initiatives in 2010–11. Canada led the group by contributing $284.6 million, well over its pledge of $220 million. All other countries allocated less than half of the funding pledged. The United Kingdom, which committed $600 million, did not provide any new funding, while France contributed a mere €5.7 million after pledging €125 million and the United States, which pledged $1.3 billion, contributed only $18.3 million. Compliance with the Muskoka Initiative had by far the lowest score of the 18 summit commitments assessed by the G8 Research Group, including those in the areas of ODA, good governance, trade, non-proliferation, and terrorism (G8 Research Group 2011, 7), indicating that non-compliance with the Initiative is indeed an outlier. Nonetheless, Canada has continued to champion the Initiative and created an accountability framework. In December 2010, Harper and Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete became co-chairs of the UN Commission on Information and Accountability for Women’s and Children’s Health. Canada continues to attempt to advance G8 policy and the new framework is an instance of Canada contributing to governance reform that may affect multilateral dysfunctionality—but effects remain to be seen.

Canada’s apparent multilateralism on the MNCH issue has its detractors. Stephen Lewis, former Canadian ambassador to the UN and UN special envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, called Harper’s Davos speech ‘a piece of crass, political opportunism’, pointing out that the Canadian government had come late to an issue that other countries had been working on for years, and stating that it sees women as mothers and little else (Berthiaume 2010). In fact, CIDA’s programs have emphasized health over the 2000–10 period and, in some cases, longer. For example, the agency has been funding micronutrient programs for decades, as well as programs to improve health systems and services for mothers and children. Still, the issue has evidently been repackaged and the prioritization of MNCH was indeed ‘sudden’ (McMillan and Besada 2010). Noting this abruptness, one observer highlighted the government’s ‘real credibility gap in this area’ (Caplan 2010). Moreover, Gordon Smith and Peter Heap (2010, 10) argue that ‘the choice of initiative seems to have been essentially a political call related to improving the government’s standing with domestic constituencies’. With Harper leading a minority government and a federal election possible at any time—one was held later that year—the promotion of (literally) a motherhood issue within a high-profile international forum likely played into calculations to garner a warm response from voters. Charges of political opportunism and electoral imperative suggest that the Canadian government’s MNCH multilateralism is primarily self-interested.

The issue became unexpectedly controversial because of the Canadian government’s unilateral stance on excluding abortion access in its programs. The government’s aversion to the abortion issue
has been linked by maternal-health advocates to its desire not to upset part of its political base (Clark 2010). Observers argue that unwanted pregnancies jeopardize health in developing countries and improved access to abortions and post-abortion care are necessary components of any MNCH initiative. Noting that 70,000 women die from unsafe abortions every year, an editorial in British medical journal the *Lancet* called Canada’s position ‘hypocritical and unjust’ given the country’s permissiveness domestically and recommended that ‘Canada and other G8 nations […] show real leadership with a final maternal health plan that is based on sound scientific evidence and not prejudice’ (*Lancet* 2010, 1580). G8 countries were free to fund MNCH projects as they pleased, but—by excluding abortion—the country leading the push for new funding and contributing significant resources undermined the credibility of the Initiative from a development perspective.

In the run-up to the Muskoka Summit, the Canadian government faced highly publicized pressure for its rigid stance on abortion access. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued that ‘You cannot have maternal health without reproductive health, and that includes contraception and family planning and access to legal, safe abortions,’ while British Foreign Secretary David Miliband argued that Britain felt the Initiative should include access to abortion (CBC News 2010). In Canada, the Standing Committee on the Status of Women released a report in June 2010 advising the government to take a ‘comprehensive approach’ to family planning that includes abortion wherever it is legal, citing effectiveness on the issue of health, but Harper said that he imposed the ban because he does not want to reopen the abortion debate, which divides Canadians (CBC News 2010; Smith 2010). A reason Canada did not garner support for the Initiative may have been because Harper did not obtain G8 buy-in through consultations, but rather suddenly imposed it. The rigid policy framework that he insisted upon may have turned a UN-supported initiative into a perceived flawed Canadian scheme, from which other G8 countries distanced themselves.

The G8 countries tacitly accepted Harper’s refusal to address the issue of abortion under the Muskoka Initiative—abortion access was not mentioned in the summit’s joint declaration. This led *Maclean*’s journalist Paul Wells (2011) to argue that, while the government is doing a lot to promote MNCH, ‘[i]n effect, the Harper Conservatives have outsourced their pro-life politics to the developing world’. He also noted that no G8 government criticized leaving abortion access out of the Initiative, nor was there any other prominent international criticism, even from governments whose own policies include access (the United States, Britain, and France provide funding for abortion where it is legal abroad). Some critics argue that abortion access is a non-issue given that Canada’s position only applies to a small group of developing countries where abortion is legal (Auld and MacDonald 2010). Widespread non-compliance could, however, be a signal that G8 countries do not wish to be associated with the Canadian approach or the Initiative. The lack of public objections could be due to G8 countries’ practice of wanting to speak in one voice following joint announcements to legitimize commitments.

While Canada adopted the MNCH policy initiative for a combination of altruistic and self-interested reasons and then attempted to use the G8 to impose its preferences internationally, it failed to mobilize a significant amount of funding from other countries, especially the United States and United Kingdom. Without more qualitative research and interviews with key decision-makers, it is impossible to determine the extent to which the exclusion of abortion access has undermined concrete G8 support for the Initiative, but the unusually widespread reluctance to follow through on commitments is striking. Simple lack of interest and scarcity of additional ODA funds during the global economic crisis are alternative explanations. The G8’s generally poor record on delivering on commitments to developing countries should be kept in mind (see McMillan and Besada 2010; Caplan 2010). However, broad interest in MNCH issues before Harper’s Davos speech followed by the palpable division in the run-up to the Muskoka Summit suggest that there is more to the story. Regardless of the actual explanation, the Muskoka Initiative is a case of Canada’s failure to multilateralize an issue within a forum that it had selected for that purpose.
Canadian multilateral development cooperation does not always involve seeking to influence other donors within a multilateral forum, as it tried to do regarding MNCH. On the issue of global food security, to which this chapter now turns, Canada focused its contributions on specific multilateral agencies.

Food security

In May 2009, in response to the global food crisis, CIDA Minister Oda announced that increasing food security would henceforth be one of the three priority themes for Canadian development assistance (CIDA 2009). A few months later, at the G8 summit in L’Aquila, Italy, Harper pledged to increase spending on food security by $600 million per year for three years (Canada 2009). In 2011, CIDA announced a $350 million contribution to the sector over a five-year period, most of which would be channelled through WFP (CIDA 2011a).

This dramatic increase in funding was the latest iteration of a waxing and waning of CIDA’s interest in the agricultural sector. For instance, the Canadian government had previously announced in 2002 that its aid program would focus on rural development and agriculture, among other sectors, only to drop it in 2005 (CIDA 2002, 14–16; Canada 2005). As Figure 6 illustrates, commitments in this area fluctuated accordingly. The 2009 announcement, however, made official an unprecedented increase in commitments that was already underway. Over the course of less than a decade, commitments skyrocketed from a low of only $21 million in 2002 to $498 million in 2010.14

![Figure 6: Canadian ODA Commitments to the Agricultural Sector](source)

Global food crises require multilateral responses (Conceição and Mendoza 2009) and a significant part of CIDA’s new food security funding was to be delivered multilaterally. Canada’s decision
to untie its food aid in 2008, thereby eliminating a direct interest in providing it bilaterally, facilitated this move. CIDA’s Food Security Strategy, released in 2010, outlined how the agency would ‘support efforts underway through the World Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development [IFAD] … to help address the food security needs of vulnerable populations, in particular, of women,’ provide food aid via WFP, and work with the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) to increase the nutritional value of food and the ‘resiliency of agricultural systems to climate change’ (CIDA 2010, 5–7).

As one would expect, Figure 7 illustrates an overall increase in core funding for CGIAR and IFAD after 2007, when Canadian commitments to the agricultural sector began to increase dramatically. However, contributions to WFP not only held steady but represented barely one-quarter of their level in the early 2000s (around $16 million, compared to about $60 million). This could be because the latest figures are for 2010, which may not allow sufficient time for intentions to translate into spending.

![Figure 7](source: OECD (2012) and CGIAR annual financial reports (see footnote))

However, figures from the WFP website paint a very different picture: a doubling of Canadian contributions between 2007 and 2011, when annual contributions almost reached $300 million, more than seven times the amount for 2001—making Canada the WFP’s second or third largest contributor depending on the year (WFP 2012; see Figure 8). Why the discrepancy?
Unlike the OECD data in Figure 7, the WFP flows represented in Figure 8 include not only core funds to the institution, but also those designated for use in specific countries, the ‘multi-bi’ funding mentioned above. In the agricultural sector, the vast majority of CIDA spending thus far has been in the form of bilateral contributions to specific countries—selected by CIDA according to its own priorities, not necessarily global need—and merely channelled through multilateral institutions, instead of being under the latter’s control. For example, CIDA announced in 2011 a $13-million contribution to WFP designated for use in Afghanistan (CIDA 2011c). This is not to suggest that CIDA’s earmarked aid does not meet authentic, urgent needs. Nonetheless, this practice retains decision-making power at CIDA headquarters and, especially when adopted by other donor countries as well, earmarking prevents multilateral institutions such as WFP from coordinating an equitable distribution of resources across countries in need.\(^\text{17}\) Donors’ growing use of similarly ‘restricted’ funding has also seriously undermined the work of other food security–related multilateral organizations (CGIAR 2008, 4–5, 53–57). It remains to be seen how much of Canada’s new assistance in the sector will be through such ‘multi-bi’ arrangements, rather than fully multilateral.

Moreover, food aid is only a charity-based, short-term, palliative measure that saves lives but does nothing to resolve the underlying causes of chronic food insecurity and acute food crises that arise periodically: poverty and inequality. It can actually exacerbate future dependency, thereby reducing food security. Though not directly applicable to Canada since it stopped providing in-kind assistance in 2008, food aid is also inextricably linked to a powerful agricultural and agro-industrial sector that receives massive subsidies from industrialized country governments and has a strong interest in the maintenance and expansion of food aid (Clapp 2009).
The insufficiencies of food aid help explain why CIDA’s food security strategy also supports research and development of new agricultural varieties and techniques to increase yield and better withstand climate change, through financial contributions managed by the World Bank, IFAD, and CGIAR, as well as Canada’s own International Development Research Centre (IDRC). Though new technologies have made tremendous contributions in the past, most notably to the ‘green revolution’ of the 1960s and ’70s, the emphasis on technical solutions ignores more fundamental political problems in agricultural producing countries in the global South. In their examination of CIDA’s land and food security policies, Denis Côté and Dominique Caouette (2012, 181) argue that ‘food insecurity is more a result of an extreme inequality in terms of access to land than of a lack of production and productivity’ (see also Quan 2000). In addition, reforming and strengthening institutions in developing countries has been found to be a prerequisite for successful poverty alleviation and assistance to the agricultural sector, which in turn are necessary to ensure food security (Abbott 2012). Food security and agricultural policies must also be embedded in broader contexts and policies, especially poverty, not in isolation (Marsden 2012). Overall, Canada’s and other aid donors’ bilateral and multilateral responses to food insecurity are unlikely to produce sustainable results (Essex 2010).

CIDA’s strategy leaves important gaps and it is not clear that other donors are filling them either. By earmarking humanitarian-oriented food aid for its priority countries, such as Afghanistan, rather than allowing it to be distributed by a multilateral institution according to need, and by emphasizing technological solutions while ignoring underlying causal factors, CIDA’s new strategy will fight food insecurity in select countries in the short term but is unlikely—barring a technological miracle—to make a significant long-term contribution to preventing its recurrence. Moreover, climate change is increasingly likely to make some of Canada’s best food security efforts more difficult, a topic to which this chapter now turns.

Global Climate Change

Canada used the multilateral system to address a changing global climate during the first half of the 2000s, but since the Conservatives came to power in 2006 the country has shied away from multilateralism in favour of unilateralism. If greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are not substantially reduced, climate change will have negative consequences for health, migration, and infrastructure, which will be disproportionately experienced by developing countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East (OECD 2009, 34–40). Preventative action, particularly by way of a legally binding treaty that substantially abates global emissions, is a UN priority. However, the issue is mired in bitter controversy and developed and developing countries are divided regarding historical responsibility for the stock of emissions currently in the atmosphere. Moreover, electoral cycles that complicate contemporaneous trade-offs in spending scarce political and monetary resources, short-term domestic political maneuvering related to the expectations of core constituencies, and the requirement of international consensus—under UN rules, every country must agree to the text of a treaty for it to be adopted—makes designing an enforceable treaty difficult (see Hovi, Sprinz, and Underdal 2009). The United States has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the world’s only binding climate change treaty, unless developing countries, particularly China, also commit to fixed emissions targets, while China and 77 other developing countries maintain that developed countries should limit emissions before developing countries cut them (Laing 2011). Once a participant in this vivid and crucial debate, the Canadian government has largely disengaged from UN negotiations, becoming the first (and at the time of writing only) country to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol.

The Conservative government’s action contrasts with its predecessors’ contributions to the multilateral response to climate change. The Liberal government of Jean Chrétien signed the Kyoto
Protocol in 1997 and ratified it in 2002. Kathryn Harrison (2007, 92, 111–13) finds that Chrétien’s normative commitment to protect the global commons, his personal commitment to multilateralism, and strong party discipline in Parliament were the primary reasons for ratification. Still, the prime minister did not follow up with a plan to reduce carbon emissions by 29 per cent below projected business-as-usual emissions in 2010. The accord establishes legally binding obligations for developed countries to reduce GHG emissions below 1990 levels, but does not obligate developing countries to reduce emissions, which means that the world’s largest emitters—China and the United States—are not bound by the current framework. Despite American recalcitrance, negligible environmental gains, and considerable implementation costs, 39 developed countries and the EU ratified the accord, along with over 150 developing countries as of November 2011.

When the Conservatives came to power in 2006, Harper repeatedly stated that his government would not implement the Kyoto Protocol signed by the former Liberal government, which had consistently failed to meet reduction targets. Canada’s ‘relentless’ emissions growth, fueled by population growth, GDP growth, and surging oil sands production, is unmatched among OECD countries (Jaccard 2007, 8–9). Harrison (2007, 110, 114–15) argues that Harper never intended to fulfill the Kyoto commitments and, in the absence of electoral pressure, his stance is compounded by persistent business opposition and demands from the provinces for federal money for climate programs. Emphasizing that the accord would jeopardize job creation in difficult economic times, Harper in 2009 set a less-stringent goal to lower GHG gases that is in line with that of the United States (Canadian Press 2011). Alongside the leaders of Russia and Japan, Harper opposed the extension of the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012, arguing that developing countries that are large emitters, such as China and India, should be obligated to meet targets (Kennedy 2011).

Although Canada has changed its position significantly over the last decade, it has always recognized that a multilateral response is required to address the problem of global climate change—a more comprehensively multilateral response, according to the Conservatives. In December 2011, immediately following the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change conference in Durban, South Africa, where 194 countries extended the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period from 2012 to 2017 and outlined a course of action that would see a new climate change treaty finalized by 2015 and come into force five years later, Environment Minister Peter Kent announced Canada’s formal withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. He cited the fact that Canada was not on track to meet targets, costs of $14 billion in compliance credits that would not have impacts on GHG emissions or the environment, and the resulting conclusion that the treaty is an ineffective, outdated attempt at a global solution to climate change (Canadian Press 2011). Countries including China and India condemned Canada’s withdrawal, and there has been much domestic criticism (see Kennedy 2011), but also some prominent support. For instance, the Globe and Mail (2011), which advocates emissions reductions, editorialized: ‘Canada was right to leave the Kyoto Protocol, rather than continue to take part in the false pretense that there is an international consensus’. Kent has stated that Canada will work toward a new global climate change treaty that legally obligates all major emitters—the United States and the developing countries whose emissions are increasing—to lower GHG emissions, while allowing Canada to generate jobs and growth (Kent 2012).

Mitigation and adaptation strategies are both necessary to address climate change, which is inherently a global problem and hence requires international solutions (see OECD 2009; Hovi, Sprinz, and Underdal 2009). Yet, Canada effectively disengaged from UN negotiations and focused on national circumstances. The government’s domestic plan commits it to reducing GHG emissions by 17 per cent below 2005 levels by 2020 and emphasizes a ‘balanced approach’ to regulation (Kent 2012). Given entrenched division between developed and developing countries, the difficulties in garnering international consensus, and a domestic plan that gives Canada significant leeway, it is questionable
how committed the government is to UN negotiations. The Canadian government’s priority is evidently Canadian economic interests.

Figure 9 presents OECD data for annual ODA commitments for environmental protection for the 2000–10 period, which includes initiatives to combat climate change. The trend line is flat, indicating that, overall, intended spending on the issue had been stagnant across the decade. The drop after 2002 is interesting since the Chrétien government ratified the Kyoto Protocol that year. The spike in 2009 presumably reflects commitments to address the global food crisis and new commitments on the environment following the previous year’s federal election, characterized by electoral pressure on environmental issues.

Source: OECD (2012)

After 2010, the Canadian government disengaged from negotiations on a new treaty, but funded multilateral schemes to help developing countries adapt to climate change and reduce emissions. For its part, CIDA approaches climate change as a development issue and supports multilateral initiatives. The agency prescribes adaptation measures and supports the reduction of global GHG emissions through involvement in the World Bank Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the UN’s Special Climate Change Fund (CIDA 2011b). In Durban, countries agreed on terms for the establishment and governance of a new multilateral fund to help developing countries adapt to climate change and promote clean energy growth. When it becomes operational in 2013, the Green Climate Fund (GFC) is expected to play a key role in new adaptation and mitigation strategies by channelling $100 billion annually to developing countries by 2020. Canada, however, refused to contribute to the fund unless its beneficiaries committed to targets and transparent
reporting (Kennedy 2011). The fund’s accountability arrangements are to be approved in Doha, Qatar, in late 2012, though CIDA’s efforts offset this refusal to some extent.

To prepare for the establishment of the GFC and kick-start funding for environmental projects, special financing was agreed at the 2009 UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen, Denmark. In support of the non-binding Copenhagen Accord that saw developed countries commit $30 billion over 2010–12, the Canadian government committed $1.2 billion to fast-start financing, focusing on adaptation by the poorest and most vulnerable countries, clean energy, and forests and agriculture (Environment Canada 2011b). This is Canada’s largest ever monetary commitment to support multilateral efforts to address climate change. Canada’s contributions are highly multilateral relative to those of other many countries, though by far its largest contribution is to support a broad portfolio of clean energy projects—the $291.5 million that is allocated to the IFC appears disproportionate when compared to the $44.5 million directly allocated for adaptation (WRI 2011, 4). This approach suggests that the Canadian government is reserving its right to pollute domestically for economic reasons, but it recognizes that this stance must be complemented with initiatives to help developing countries primarily reduce emissions and secondarily adapt to new adversities resulting from climate change.

When spending levels are viewed in a comparative perspective, the Canadian government is doing its share. Canada’s initial 2010 contribution—the only contribution for which cross-national comparisons were available at the time of writing—was approximately 4 per cent of total multilateral assistance. Its total amount pledged is well behind Japan, the United States, and many European countries including the United Kingdom and France (WRI 2011, 1–6, 12). This makes sense because the Canadian economy is smaller. Climate Action Network Canada (2011) argues that the total amount pledged is in line with Canada’s ‘fair share’, though the announcement of further investment in Durban should be seen in the context of the government’s inaction—at that point it had already decided to withdraw from Kyoto. The announcement effectively deflected attention away for Canada’s disengagement from negotiations.

Moreover, the vast majority of funding has thus far gone to the IFC to be lent to the private sector to mitigate emissions, rather than made available to developing countries for immediate adaptation activities (Climate Action Network Canada 2011). Africa is responsible for 4 per cent of global emissions and only large, richer countries like South Africa are able to ‘meaningfully contribute’ to mitigating climate change (World Bank 2011, 18). Nonetheless, adaptation is particularly important for Africa, since it is the continent most affected by the negative impacts of climate change (see Besada and Sewenkanmbo 2009; UNFCCC COP 2010). International support for fast-start financing is therefore necessary to help the poorest and most vulnerable countries to reduce emissions and cope with the effects of climate change. The Copenhagen Accord commits developed countries to ‘balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation’ (UNFCCC COP 2010, 7), but Canada evidently prioritizes the latter goal.

Regardless, Canada’s funding strategy indicates that the government prefers to shift the burden of emissions reductions to developing countries. Developed countries tend to prioritize funding for mitigation because of its global benefits; adaptation in developing countries tends to have only local and regional benefits—from which developed countries gain nothing (Rübbelke 2011, 1472–74). With its IFC funding, Canada’s stated objective is to catalyze private sector investment and innovation to realize long-term financing and mitigation goals (Canada 2011a). Although CIDA’s focus is almost exclusively on adaptation measures and IDRC is supporting adaptation research, the scale of Canada’s funding for mitigation dwarfs these initiatives. Many developed countries—the United Kingdom and the United States in particular—have funding strategies that are more balanced than Canada’s (WRI 2011, 1–6).

Environmental protection is a global public good—it benefits all countries—but providing it has become the world’s greatest collective action problem. Since all benefit and given the long-term nature of climate change, there is a strong incentive to free ride. Canada’s persistent emissions growth,
disengagement from UN negotiations, domestic strategy that prioritizes Canadian economic growth, and choice to provide only an average level of development assistance indicate that, overall, the country is a free rider on other countries’ efforts. Canada had been unable to influence the multilateral response to climate change through the UN and its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol did not influence others to follow suit, leaving it in an embarrassing position. However, while the Canadian government has largely disengaged at the UN level, it does fund multilateral initiatives to support mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. By following through on its overall funding commitment set out in the Copenhagen Accord, the government has adopted an ambivalent stance, simultaneously disengaging from the UN at one level and supporting it at another. Multilateralism on the issue of climate change has become a way to reject international efforts that might constrain jobs and growth domestically, while helping developing countries adapt to climate change and reduce emissions. Although its strategy to help developing countries is to some extent commendable, Canada leaves a disproportionate share of the burden of emissions reductions to other countries because of its short-term interests.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined Canada’s multilateral development cooperation vis-à-vis major global development challenges at the beginning of the 21st century. It has identified specific trends and outlined dynamics in multilateral aid mainly during the 2000–10 period, focusing on a major MNCH initiative, food security, and climate change policy. The evolution of Canadian ODA financial contributions to multilateral agencies and the Canadian government’s actions and inaction in the areas of MNCH, food security, and climate change demonstrate that the Canadian government increasingly used—or tried to use—specific multilateral fora and institutions to pursue national interests and disengaged in cases when the institutions went against Canadian interests. There were instances where Canada made generous multilateral contributions, but even these showed a significant self-interested dimension or offset the effects of self-interested policies.

Canada’s real contributions to multilateral development organizations, especially UN agencies, slowly declined in dollar terms and the proportion of ODA it provided to multilateral institutions fell more dramatically. The Canadian government, however, increased its contributions to the World Bank and RDBs, though the motives for the change were unclear and it is too early to know if the trend will be sustained. Notably, Canada increasingly channelled funds designated for specific purposes in certain countries through multilateral organizations, as opposed to providing core funding to those organizations themselves. Canada’s increased use of multilateral organizations as conduits for bilateral funding suggested that Canada saw advantages in selectively using some of them to meet its own national goals and priorities.

Regarding the Muskoka Initiative, it appears that while there was prior international interest in MNCH issues, Canada tried to make the issue its own within the G8 for humanitarian and electoral reasons, but largely failed to get more than rhetorical endorsement, potentially due to its firm stance against abortion access. Canada was unable to multilateralize MNCH issues within the G8, but remained committed to the Initiative, as evidenced by contributions in excess of pledges and the creation of an international accountability framework. If most Canadians are not aware of Canada’s failure with the Initiative, it may have served its domestic public relations purpose to a certain extent.

In response to the global food crisis, Canada dramatically increased funding for food security, including through additional multilateral funding to WFP, the World Bank, IFAD, and CGIAR. However, the vast majority of CIDA spending on food aid were contributions earmarked for specific countries—chosen by CIDA according to its own interests, rather than global need—and channelled through multilateral institutions, rather than being under the latter’s control, which did not actually constitute
multilateral assistance. It is not yet clear to what extent this might also be the case for assistance to the other multilateral agencies in this sector. Moreover, Canada’s focus on research and development funding might somewhat increase food security, but without addressing—or ensuring that other donors address—poverty and inequality, especially regarding access to land, food insecurity will remain a serious global problem.

At face value, Canada’s rapid emissions growth and disengagement from UN negotiations has hindered global efforts to tackle climate change. Though the Canadian government unilaterally abandoned its international obligations to reduce emissions in order to safeguard jobs and improve growth prospects domestically, it increased spending via multilateral channels to help developing countries adapt and reduce emissions themselves. Since Canadian aid in this sector is at an average level when compared to other donors, it cannot be said to compensate for inaction at home. While its strategy in developing countries should result in various benefits, Canada has shifted the burden of action to other countries, confirming that it is essentially a free rider on others’ efforts.

This picture of Canadian multilateral development cooperation suggests that the Canadian government had very little interest in strengthening multilateralism. It increasingly adopted a utilitarian approach, for example on MNCH issues, and decided to act unilaterally when it was in its interest to do so, for instance on the issue of emissions reductions. Its efforts to address global food security, while flawed, and its support for adaptation and emissions reductions in developing countries were to a certain extent commendable. Overall, however, this issue-by-issue approach hindered efforts to adapt the multilateral system to 21st century global development challenges. It resembles behaviour that ‘realist’ international relations scholars expect from hegemonic global powers, not middle powers like Canada that have long supported multilateral solutions to global problems.

This chapter’s findings suggest that Canada’s multilateral development cooperation could improve in at least three concrete ways. First, the government could reduce its use of multilateral organizations as conduits for bilateral aid, which could increase aid effectiveness. It could also help strengthen the institutions themselves, jointly with other member countries, rather than undermining the organizations’ missions, priorities, and procedures. Second, Canada’s effectiveness as a development partner would be enhanced if the government included access to safe, legal abortions in future projects under the Muskoka Initiative and also addressed broader poverty and inequality concerns in its food security strategy. Third, to increase prospects for designing a new climate change treaty that would benefit all parties, it could contribute constructively to negotiations in 2015 rather than refusing to participate.

By acting in a less self-interested way, Canada could renew its commitment to multilateral development cooperation and contribute to a more effective response to global challenges, which require a multilateral approach that by definition cannot be based on national interest. In particular, Canada and other countries could reinvigorate multilateral practices, seize the opportunities to work with new and old partners in multilateral development cooperation, and contribute to establishing a more stable, equitable, and prosperous international system, which is in all countries’ long-term interest. Multilateralism will continue to fray, however, if Canada and its peers act according to more narrowly defined, short-term self-interest.

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**Notes**

1. Because the chapter focuses on development cooperation, we do not consider Canada’s contributions to multilateral efforts that relate more to the realm of diplomacy or security, for example, in Afghanistan or Libya.
2. Most Canadians have a strong—and often exaggerated—sense of their country’s contributions to multilateral institutions and the respect that such support garners abroad. Many consider supporting a significant role for Canada in international affairs as being integral to what it means to be Canadian.
4. Unless specified otherwise, all ODA amounts cited in this chapter are taken from OECD (2012), based on data provided by the Canadian government. They are expressed in constant US dollars (at 2009 prices) to facilitate comparison. Such data are harder to obtain directly from CIDA, notably because they are not adjusted for inflation and it is not always clear if they qualify as ODA.
5. With those exclusions, Canada provided an average of about 25 per cent of its ODA multilaterally in 2007–09. Among DAC members, the highest shares were contributed by Korea (29 per cent), Italy (28 per cent), and Sweden (26 per cent), and the lowest by Portugal (12 per cent), the United States (12 per cent), and Greece (11 per cent) (OECD 2011, 25).
6. The Department of Finance, rather than CIDA, is responsible for Canada’s contributions to the World Bank, making coordination with other aid programs more difficult. The fluctuations could be due in part to the fact that the Canadian government’s fiscal years differ from international organizations’ use of calendar years for accounting purposes. Moreover, the replenishment of some World Bank funds does not always occur on a constant annual basis.
7. As mentioned above regarding the World Bank, one should not over-interpret year-to-year variations because replenishments do not necessarily occur annually. Moreover, as explained below, there are more practical explanations for decisions regarding funding levels.
8. Much depends, however, on what dimensions of development assistance are being measured and how they are aggregated. A joint study by the Washington D.C.-based Center for Global Development and Brookings Institution gave high scores to multilateral lending agencies for ‘maximizing efficiency’ and ‘fostering institutions’, but much lower ones on ‘transparency and learning’ (Birdsall et al. 2010). Multilateral aid organizations also compare poorly in other areas, including significantly higher administrative costs, explained by higher salaries and more generous benefits for employees (Easterly...

9. Unlike all other amounts in this chapter, these figures are in Canadian dollars, which at the time of writing were very close to being at par with US dollars.

10. For a more complete list of advantages and disadvantages from various perspectives, see OECD (2011, 29).

11. By way of comparison, figures for DAC donors as a whole for the same year were 28 per cent of ODA to multilateral agencies themselves and an additional 12 per cent of ODA using multilateral organizations as bilateral aid conduits. The corresponding figures for France were 45 and 1 per cent; the United Kingdom, 34 and 22 per cent; and the United States, 12 and 15 per cent (OECD 2011, 5, 24, 54).

12. According to World Health Organization and World Bank estimates, the Initiative would help developing countries to prevent 1.3 million child deaths and 64,000 maternal deaths, while enabling 12 million couples to access modern methods of family planning over the five-year period (G8 2010, 3). For more information on the Muskoka Initiative, including principles, mechanisms, and targets, see Annex I of the G8 Muskoka Declaration. See Canada (2011b) for a list of MNCH projects that have been allocated funding.

13. Unlike for the previous figures, the data relating to the agricultural sector refer to official commitments, rather than actual disbursements, as that is how they are recorded in the OECD statistical database.

14. Part of this dramatic growth could be attributed to a greater emphasis on agriculture in the sectoral coding of CIDA projects, rather than solely to a new program priority. Still, CIDA’s return to the agricultural sector mirrored that of other donors in response to the food crisis. It followed a period of chronic underfunding of multilateral agricultural institutions.

15. CGIAR is a network of development organizations that focus on agricultural research, including 15 research centres located across the world.


17. WFP, UNICEF and other multilateral agencies are aware that donors often prefer to designate their assistance to certain countries and use the occasion to boost their public profile. Out of pragmatism, the organizations have therefore established channels to facilitate such contributions, including launching specific emergency appeals.

18. For a discussion on the leadership role of the EU in international climate politics, see Hovi, Skodvin, and Andresen (2003). Notably, the EU created an internal burden-sharing agreement that established differentiated emissions reductions targets for its member countries, an arrangement that allows some countries to pollute over the Kyoto targets based on their level of development (Hovi, Skodvin, and Andresen 2003, 10, 17).

19. Canada is responsible for approximately 2 per cent of global emissions, China over 20 per cent, the United States around 18 per cent, the EU about 14 per cent, and India and Russia approximately 5 per cent each (Environment Canada 2011a, 13). Developing countries together (including China and India) accounted for an estimated 57 per cent of global emissions in 2010, but emissions per person were significantly higher in developed countries (Gillis 2011).

20. When Canada withdrew the accord covered only 13 per cent of global emissions, a number that is set to shrink as emerging market economies continue to rapidly develop (Kent 2012).

21. Like with its agricultural sector data, the OECD records statistical data on official commitments, rather than actual disbursements, for overall environmental protection ODA.

22. The World Bank Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, which CIDA is helping to fund over the 2008–14 period, supports country-led adaptation projects and will help up to ten least-developed countries
and small island states vulnerable to climate change to integrate adaptation measures and approaches into environmental, public sector, and water sector policies and improve administrative management. Along with partner countries, the GEF provides financing for innovative technologies and policy development, and technical assistance and capacity development. Canada has greatly increased its funding to the GEF and is contributing $216.5 million over the 2010–14 period (WRI 2011, 12; CIDA 2012c). The GEF operates the UN’s Special Climate Change Fund, which finances projects that prioritize adaptation, technology transfer, and associated capacity-building activities.

23. Canada’s first $400 million, announced in June 2010, supported various multilateral initiatives, the largest three being: $291.5 million allocated to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group that provides concessional loans, to encourage private investment and innovation to reduce GHG emissions in developing countries; $40 million to the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Readiness Fund to build capacity to address deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and $20 million to the Least-Developed Countries Fund to support 49 especially vulnerable countries in adopting National Adaptation Programmes of Action on Climate Change (Canada 2011a). Notably, IDRC received $10 million to support seven African research centres in conducting climate change adaptation research (Canada 2011a). In Durban in December 2011, Kent announced further investment of $600 million for 2011–12 and 2012–13, though did not provide details (Environment Canada 2011b).

24. According to Bruce Montador, former CIDA Vice-President for Multilateral Programs and former Executive Director representing Canada at the African Development Bank, the Canadian government and other donors provide concessional financing for mitigation because, with the ability to estimate the dollar cost of carbon dioxide emissions, it is easier to decide on the allocation of funds for mitigation than for adaptation. Moreover, clean energy projects generate revenues. By way of contrast, adaptation projects typically do not generate revenues and therefore require grant funding. Also, because there are no clear criteria for ranking proposals, decision making becomes more political and thus more difficult (personal communication, October 2012).

25. There is much debate over justification for adaptation, its effects, and best strategies. It can be regarded as a ‘confidence-building activity’ that could increase the trust of developing countries and improve the prospects of success of international negotiations (Rübbelke 2011, 1478).