Canada’s Development Interventions: Unpacking Motives and Effectiveness in Canadian Foreign Aid

Stephen Brown
University of Ottawa
brown@uottawa.ca

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Introduction: Framing aid motives

What have been the overarching goals of Canada’s foreign aid program over the past 15 years? How have the Liberal and Conservative governments expressed them? And what impact do the motives have on the effectiveness of these “development interventions”? This chapter assesses Canada’s aid at the macro-level. It does not evaluate aid projects or programs per se, but rather the broader rationales—the extent to which they were invoked and the implications for development—using aid-related initiatives to illustrate the trends. To do so, it goes beyond the usual dichotomy of self-interest vs. altruistic aid motives applied to Canadian foreign aid. Instead, it adopts as an analytical framework based on Maurits van der Veen’s (2011) seven “frames” that express the motives for foreign aid. For each one, I explore the extent to which the goal has been used to justify aid initiatives and the consequences for aid effectiveness, comparing the record of Liberal and Conservative governments since about 2000.

Historically, the most important analyst of Canadian foreign aid has been Cranford Pratt. He conceptualized debates over foreign aid as a clash between two perspectives. One hand, the “humane internationalist” view, espoused by most development specialists within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as the majority of Canadians, is based on an ethical commitment to reducing poverty and inequality around the world. On the other hand, the “international realist” perspective, favoured by many politicians and most officials from other government departments, as well as corporate executives, sought to advance Canadian commercial and security interests (Pratt 1999; 2003; see discussion in Black 2014). Similarly, Keith Spicer, author of the first book on Canadian foreign aid, speaks of a “trinity” of altruistic, commercial and political motives (Spicer 1966), an expression that David Morrison, in his history of CIDA and Canadian aid, also uses (Morrison 1998, 12–16; for a critique, see Nossal 1998).

The underlying rationales for foreign aid, however, are more complex than the broad altruistic/humanitarian, diplomatic/geopolitical and commercial categories that most authors use. Van der Veen’s book Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid compares frames in the statements of politicians in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway. In it, he identifies seven categories of aid goals: “security, power and influence, economic self-interest (wealth), enlightened self-interest, self-affirmation and reputation, obligation and duty, and humanitarianism”, recognizing that some can overlap (van der Veen 2011, 10). Van der Veen’s categorization improves on previous conceptions of motives by unpacking the multiplicity of frames that can be characterized as self-interested, in addition to bringing
attention to ideational (as opposed to material) goals, which tend to be overlooked in discussions of motives for aid.

In Figure 1, I place the seven frames in a two-dimensional matrix according to the degree of self-interest/altruism they embody and the extent to which they are material or ideational goals. With respect to the first dimension, economic self-interest and humanitarianism both constitute material goals, whereas reputation and obligation are ideational ones. By way of illustration in the second dimension, economic self-interest and reputation are both self-interested, while humanitarianism is altruistic.¹

**Figure 1: Mapping the frames**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-interested</th>
<th>Altruistic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic self-interest/wealth</td>
<td>Humanitarianism</td>
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<td>Security</td>
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<td>Enlightened self-interest</td>
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<td>Power/influence</td>
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<td>Ideational</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-affirmation/reputation</td>
<td>Obligation/duty</td>
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Below I use each of these seven categories to analyze Canadian aid interventions since the turn of the 21st century. I find that the emphasis on specific goals varies over time and not necessarily neatly according to party in power or prime minister. The broad pattern, however, suggests that: 1) the Martin Liberals and the Harper government placed great emphasis on the security frame, but the Conservatives largely abandoned the frame after the withdrawal of Canadian troops from combat roles in Afghanistan; 2) the Chrétien and Martin Liberals emphasized ideational frames more than the Conservatives, and more effectively; and 3) the Harper government has been focusing its message on two rather contradictory material frames in recent years: economic self-interest and humanitarianism. A focus on economic self-interest is actually detrimental to development interests, while the strategic deployment of altruistic language can camouflage some harmful practices impelled by a motive absent from van der Veen’s framework: domestic political interests, especially electoral calculations. The latter could even be considered a “master frame” for interpreting aid policy, as I will argue in this chapter’s final section.

**Applying aid frames to Canada**

**Frame 1: Security**

Security became an important justification for foreign aid, in Canada and elsewhere, after the al-Qaeda attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. The effect on Canadian development assistance,

¹ This figure is meant to be illustrative rather than definitive. Regardless of any quibbles regarding the exact placement of each goal along the two continua, it is the broad placement of the frames that matters for the purposes of this chapter.
however, was not immediate. A policy statement on aid, entitled *Canada Making a Difference in the World*, released in 2002 but first drafted before 9/11, makes no mention of Canadian security interests (CIDA 2002). After Paul Martin succeeded Jean Chrétien as Liberal party leader and prime minister, his government released an International Policy Statement, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. Unlike the previous white paper, it was replete with mentions of the need for security, warning for instance that the lack of development abroad “will have an impact on Canada[’]s... long-term security” (CIDA 2005, 1).²

National and global security became very important aid considerations in parallel with Canada’s participation in the so-called war on terror, all the more after the 2006 election of a Conservative government led by Stephen Harper. In Afghanistan in particular, security and development considerations fused, as military actors became increasingly involved in the delivery of foreign aid, especially after Canada assumed the leadership of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in the Afghan province of Kandahar in 2005. Canadian official development assistance to Afghanistan rose exponentially from meagre US$7 million in 2000 (the last year before the US-led invasion) to a peak of $345 million in 2007 (equivalent to 11% of all Canadian bilateral aid), dropping to $101 million in 2012, after Canadian combat troops left the country (OECD 2014c). US-occupied Iraq also became an important destination of Canadian aid, receiving $386 million in 2005 (14% of Canadian bilateral aid), mainly in the form of debt relief (OECD 2014c).³ The security focus of Canadian aid ebbed after 2007 and especially after handing over responsibility for the Kandahar PRT to the Americans in early 2011. The changing importance in Canadian aid of Afghanistan and other countries can been seen in Table 1, which provides a snapshot of the top recipients in 2002–2003, 2007–2008 and 2012–2013 (two-year averages).

**Table 1: Top 15 Recipients of Canadian Official Development Assistance**

Gross disbursements as a percentage of total ODA (two-year averages)

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<tr>
<td>States Ex-Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo, Dem. Rep.</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Palestinian Adm. Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total above</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>Total above</td>
</tr>
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Sources: OECD (2010, Table 32; 2014b, Table 32)

² For an analysis the government’s vision of development in the 2005 policy statement, see Brown (2007). On the burgeoning literature on the relationship between security and development, see Spear and Williams (2012).

³ These OECD figures represent net official development assistance expressed in current US dollars.
It is hard to measure precisely the impact of security-motivated aid on Canadian and global security. Clearly, billions of dollars in Western aid have not succeeded in bringing peace and security to Afghanistan and Iraq. How effective was security-oriented aid in achieving development? Unsurprisingly to aid experts, the hundreds of millions of dollars in Canadian aid delivered in Kandahar that was mainly based on very short-term security interests may have had a some short-term impact (Leprince and Tourreille, this volume), but failed to provide sustained development outcomes (Breede 2014; Taylor 2013, 7). Even the official Canadian government evaluation of its Afghanistan aid program during the period 2004-2012 recognized that “short-term implementation strategies [in Kandahar]... failed to ensure sustainable, long-term development results” (DFATD 2015: 48). Nonetheless, Canada did prove its loyalty to its NATO allies, especially the United States, in sharing the security-related burden, regardless of actual long-term results.

Frame 2: Power and influence

The Chrétien government, at least in the prime minister’s final years, during which he was motivated by the desire for a legacy, tried to influence its fellow donor countries. The clearest case of this attempt was at the 2002 G8 summit, held in Kananaskis, Alberta, where Chrétien placed Africa at the heart of the summit agenda, which led to a joint African Action Plan. After a period in the 1990s during which the Chrétien government had effectively cut it in half, Canadian aid to Africa grew rapidly (Brown 2013, 182–84). Martin continued the emphasis on Africa, but by the time he succeeded Chrétien UK Prime Minister Tony Blair had seized the mantle of leadership on aid to Africa.

Harper initially continued along the path laid out by his Liberal predecessors, doubling both total aid expenditures and in particular aid to Africa. Within a couple of years, he started to take a new direction. In 2007, he announced a new emphasis on the Americas, breaking with the donor consensus on the need to focus on the poorest continent. His government sought less to influence other donors than the governments of recipient countries. The 2007 federal budget announced the government’s “aim to be among the largest five donors in core countries of interest” (Canada 2007, 262). However, by its own admission, the Harper government has achieved the goal of being among the top five bilateral donors in only 8–12 out of CIDA’s 20–25 official countries of focus in any given year between 2007 and 2011 (Canada 2014). Even with “top five” status, it is unclear that Canada holds considerable sway in those 8–12 countries (Brown 2007, 101).

It is hard to argue that Canada had much influence over its donor peers at any point in the period examined in this chapter. However, since the mid-2000s, Canada’s influence on development issues has declined, exacerbated by the Harper government’s go-it-alone approach and its subsequent cuts to the Canadian aid budget (discussed below)—while the global aid total reached a record high in 2013 (OECD 2014a). It tried to regain influence by championing maternal, newborn and child health

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4 On the regional distribution of Canadian aid over time, see Brown (2013).
5 The originally stated goal did not specify that it was meant to apply only to bilateral donors, but the government scorecard (Canada 2014) excludes multilateral agencies such as the World Bank. As a result, the actual number of countries in which Canada actually is a top-five donor would be lower than the government figures indicate.
6 In 2014, according to preliminary figures, Canada had the tenth largest aid program in the OECD, while 15 OECD countries provided more aid than Canada as a proportion of their gross national income, including eight European countries that were more than twice as generous as Canada (OECD 2015a). As one observer notes, "If there is anything worse (from the diplomatic point of view) than the value-imperialism of the strong, it is the value-imperialism of the weak. It lacks political clout... it can make Canadians seem too precious by half to their counterparts abroad" (Stairs 2003, 252).
(MNCH), a Canadian priority since the 2010 G8 summit in Muskoka, Ontario. However, as David Black notes, “Canadian leadership aspirations on MNCH has been constrained by the paucity of followership” (Black 2013, 243; see also Brown and Olender 2013, 166–70).

Frame 3: Economic self-interest

Economic self-interest has been an important part of Canadian aid, even before the founding of CIDA in 1968 (see Spicer 1966). Tied aid—that is, requiring grants and loans to developing countries to be spent in Canada—epitomize commercial self-interest. As well, CIDA long supported the Canadian private sector, including through a dedicated “industrial cooperation” unit. In addition, Chrétien’s Kananaskis announcements in 2002 included Cdn$100 million to support Canadian investment in Africa. The sectoral priorities for aid announced by the Chrétien government in 2002 and Martin in 2005 included support to the private sector.

Though the Harper government eliminated tied aid by 2013, Canadian commercial self-interest has increased considerably since the early 2010s, clearly visible in the discourse of successive ministers. For instance, Julian Fantino, Minister of International Cooperation (2012-2013), has declared that the Canadian government has “a duty and a responsibility to ensure that Canadian interests are promoted” by its aid program and that “Canadians are entitled to derive a benefit” (quoted in Mackrael 2012). He and his successor Christian Paradis have constantly emphasized the role of Canadian private sector, increasingly aligning Canada’s development program with the interests of Canadian mining companies to the extent that one can speak of a “recommercialization” of Canadian aid (Brown 2014; see also Audet and Navarro-Flores 2014; Goyette 2014).

Even before CIDA was merged with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2013, it was having trouble defending its legislated “central focus on poverty reduction” (Canada 2008, Subsection 2(1)). In most instances, a March 2013 internal review of CIDA programming invoked Canadian commercial interests to justify aid levels to countries of interest, making no reference to development needs or poverty reduction (Mackrael 2014).

The abolition of CIDA is likely to facilitate the further commercialization of Canadian aid. The first policy paper published by the new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), the Global Markets Action Plan, seeks to “entrench the concept of ‘economic diplomacy’ as the driving force behind the Government of Canada’s activities through its international diplomatic network” (Canada 2013, 11). The only mention of foreign aid is an expression of the desire to “leverage development programming to advance Canada’s trade interests” (Canada 2013, 13). The emphasis on the Canadian extractive sector’s interests was already reflected in the Conservative government’s choice of Peru, Colombia and Honduras as new CIDA countries of focus in 2009, but was subsequently amplified by the addition of mineral-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mongolia and Myanmar to Canada’s list in 2014.7

The growing emphasis on commercial self-interest is likely to reduce the effectiveness of Canadian aid at reducing poverty, inasmuch as poverty reduction is a secondary goal. It might not fare much better in promoting Canadian corporate interests if previous experiences are any indication. For instance, CIDA’s Industrial Cooperation Program spent Cdn$1.1 billion between 1978 and 2005, but an internal evaluation found that only 15.5% of projects from 1997 to 2002 had actually been successfully implemented (CIDA 2007, 8, 13, 17).

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7 Congo was actually already an important recipient—see Figure 1 above.
The enlightened self-interest frame relates to the pursuit of global public goods, such as “peace, stability, environmental health [and] population control” (van der Veen 2011, 10). It provides a point of potential convergence between altruistic and self-interested actors, for they can agree on the need to promote development, whether it is out of concern and solidarity or instead the benefits that a peaceful, stable, prosperous world would bring to Canada.

In practice, it is difficult to identify concrete measures that Canada has taken to make positive contribution in these areas through the use of foreign aid. The principle exception concerns the environment, especially climate change mitigation and adaptation. Canada has provided significant assistance to developing countries, while resisting any commitment to reducing emissions domestically, acting as a spoiler in international negotiations in this area. Though Canada’s record under Chrétien and Martin were far from exemplary, under Harper Canada has increasingly eschewed “enlightened” multilateral approaches that are essential to reach global public goods (Brown and Olender 2013, 174–79). Canada has thus shown a limited commitment to using aid to meet its long-term interests, especially since the Conservative party came to power.

Frame 5: Self-affirmation and reputation

Canada used to enjoy a positive international reputation, but it is generally perceived to be in decline, at least since Harper was elected in 2006, epitomized by its failure to obtain a seat in the UN Security Council in 2010. In fact, the Harper government has deliberately sought to distance itself from the “liberal internationalism” of previous governments (Paris 2014, 277–81). The Harper government continually touts its leadership on a variety of development issues, as evidenced by a plethora of DFATD press releases, but there is no sign that other countries actually recognize Canada’s self-professed leadership in the development field, as argued above under the second frame, “power and influence.”

In Afghanistan, Canada’s adopted three much-publicized “signature projects” to “brand” its aid program: the high-profile rehabilitation of Kandahar’s Dahla Dam, promoting education and the eradication of polio. However, all three fell short of their objectives (Breeede 2014; Canadian Press 2014; Watson 2012a; 2012b; see also DFATD 2015). The adoption of such high-profile, stand-alone projects illustrate how attempts at self-affirmation can actually backfire by bringing attention to disappointing results, if not outright failure.

Public international criticisms of Canadian aid policies are relatively rare, but senior Canadian officials’ responses have done little to enhance their government’s reputation. For instance, in 2013, when UN and US State Department officials criticized Fantino’s announcement that Canadian aid to Haiti—one of Canada’s top aid recipients (see Figure 1 above)—would be frozen, he petulantly retorted “Shame on them,” adding “These comments [...] are irresponsible when matched with our commitment. We should be thanked upside down and sideways” (Kelly 2013).9

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8 The proportion of aid allocated to multilateral institutions, however, barely decreased, averaging 28% under the last eight years of Liberal governments (1998–2005) and 27% during the first eight years of Conservative rule (2006–2012) (author’s calculations, based on data from OECD 2015b). It is possible, however, that the contributions shifted between different types of organizations, for instance from UN development agencies to the World Bank and regional development banks.

9 For an in-depth examination of Canada’s contribution to security and stability in Haiti, see Gaëlle Rivard Piché’s chapter in this volume.
Frame 6: Obligation and duty

In the realm of foreign aid, most international norms constitute “soft law” rather than hard obligations or duties. Both Liberal and Conservative governments avoid statements that would suggest that they obligated to provide aid or that there is a right to development (which was recognized by the UN General Assembly in 1986), preferring to portray aid as an act of munificence. Governments would rather use their own voluntary commitments as its benchmarks for aid. The Conservatives have even dedicated a web page to tracking how it has already achieved or is on track to meet its international assistance commitments (Canada 2014), though not without fudging some of the numbers.10

The commitments listed, however, leave out some key international ones. The Conservative government officially abandoned Canada’s pledge to allocate 0.7% of gross national income to foreign aid, made by Canada and other industrialized countries at the UN in 1970 and most recently reaffirmed in 2002. Using that metric, it was under the Chrétien Liberals that Canada reached the nadir of 0.22% in 2001, lower than any year since 1965, but starting in 2011 the Conservatives reversed the subsequent increases (OECD 2015b), which coincided with the scaling down of aid to Afghanistan (see Figure 2 below). The ratio for 2014 is 0.24% (OECD 2015), significantly lower than when the Harper government was first elected, and it will probably fall further, as the Canadian economy grows and the government continues to cut the aid budget, possibly falling below the 2001 low point in 2015.

The government also underplays the commitments it made by signing the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. According to an OECD evaluation, Canada only met two out of the nine quantitative targets that it pledged to achieve by 2010; for some indicators, its record actually worsened (OECD 2012, 170). In this, Canada was not alone: Most donors failed miserably to meet their Paris Declaration commitments.

10 Above, I mentioned how the goal of being one of the top five donors morphed into becoming one of the top five bilateral donors—and how a success rate of about 50% is presented as sufficient to constitute “completing” the commitment. Similarly, the Harper government’s goal of spending 80% of bilateral aid in its 20 countries of concentration, announced in 2009, can only be considered “completed” by measuring instead the opaque subset of bilateral aid that the government refers to as “country program aid” (Canada 2014). Carment et al. (2013, 7–8) calculate that the figure for bilateral aid as a whole in 2011 was actually 39%, less than half the target.
Figure 2: Generosity of Canadian Aid, 1974–2014

Source: OECD (2015b). Note: The figure for 2014 is preliminary. The UN target is 0.7%

Frame 7: Humanitarianism

A comparison of the aid data for the last eight years of Liberal governments (1998–2005) with the first eight years of the Harper government (2006–2013) reveals some interesting results. Notwithstanding the greater focus on self-interest highlighted above, under the Conservatives Canada has significantly increased the proportion of bilateral aid spent in least-developed countries (from 16% to 26%, on average) and more than halved the share spent in upper middle-income countries (from 10% to 4%). The Conservatives also considerably boosted the proportion of aid spending committed to humanitarian assistance (from 7% to 12%).11

The Liberals occasionally invoked social justice as a motive for helping the poor, at least at the rhetorical level (for instance, CIDA 2005, 21, 27), and provided a high-profile response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. The Conservatives have placed greater emphasis on the charitable side of aid and have increased the visibility of humanitarian responses, especially the Haitian earthquake of 2010. The choice in 2009 of food security as one of CIDA’s three priority themes, along with children and

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11 The percentages are the author’s calculation based on figures from OECD (2015). A caveat on the interpretation of those figures: A large proportion of the aid is not allocated by income groupings. This proportion decreased under the Conservatives, from 34% to 30%, on average. Still, the greater specificity under the Conservatives is not enough to account for the relative increase in aid to least-developed countries and or the drop in the proportion allocated to upper middle-income countries.
youth, also fits within the humanitarian frame. Since 2010, Canada has also placed great emphasis on “saving” women and children under the MNCH initiative.12

Though the growing prominence of humanitarian activities and spending in low-income countries can be considered welcome from a development perspective, one must not conclude that it is unproblematic. Canada’s limited efforts to combat climate change, for instance, increase the probability of future natural disasters. Moreover, the nature of aid, and not just its destination, must be taken into account. For example, assistance to a least-developed country could actually be meant to support the activities of a Canadian mining company, rather than poverty reduction. As Aisha Ahmad’s chapter in this volume illustrates well, food aid can be harmful in many ways to developing countries, even if it is framed as “humanitarian.”

The hidden frame: Domestic political interests

A limitation of van der Veen’s (2011) seven frames is that he conceptualized them to be applied only to public discourse. Studying politicians’ publicly expressed motive, however, ignores the fact that no politician will admit to saying something mainly in order to get elected. For that reason, I refer to self-interested electoral considerations as an eight frame. I call it “hidden” in a nod to James Scott’s (1990) concept of the “hidden transcript,” even though it is not particularly hard to discern. It could also be considered a master frame through which to interpret the seven others.13

All governments play to the domestic public when taking new foreign policy and aid policy initiatives. As mentioned above, Chrétien, for instance, was thinking of his legacy when he adopted a focus on Africa in 2002—since concentrating aid on Africa, the region of greatest need, is often considered a manifestation for charitable concern (Black 2015). The Harper government in particular has placed great emphasis on visible, short-term results—best illustrated by the three signature projects in Afghanistan—which is often detrimental to aid effectiveness, as it discourages attempts to solve root problems (Vollmer 2014). Global development requires transformational activities to reduce poverty over the long term, not band-aid assistance to alleviate the symptoms of poverty for a few years. Harper himself has prominently touted his personal leadership on MNCH (rather than leave the file to the Minister of International Development), presumably trying to present the image of a prime minister who cares, as opposed to a distant, cold, calculating politician, as many perceive him.

Domestic political considerations can be observed in the choice of some countries of focus, none more than Ukraine. The latter has been on all four Liberal and Conservative lists of countries of concentration, despite being on the border of the European Union and thus a natural place for Canada to leave to the EU to focus on. The explanation lies in the fact that over one million Canadians (and potential voters) are of Ukrainian descent. The Conservative Party in particular has targeted ethnic minorities for electoral purposes, a phenomenon that was especially apparent over the summer of 2014, when Tory ministers, junior ministers and Members of Parliament “consulted” with diasporic communities and announced new aid projects in their countries of origin.14

12 For critiques of Harper’s approach to and emphasis on MNCH, see the blogs of the McLeod Group (May-June 2014), available at http://www.mcleodgroup.ca/tag/maternal-health/.
13 Similarly, Nossal (2014) argues that to understand Canadian foreign policy under the Harper government, one should consider the “primacy of the ballot box.”
14 For instance, in August 2014 alone: 1) Christian Paradis, Minister of International Development, announced new assistance to Haiti at a “roundtable” with members of the Haitian-Canadian community in Montreal; 2) Lois Brown, Parliamentary Secretary for International Development, along with local Conservative MP Jeff Watson, held a “consultation” with the Ukrainian diaspora in Windsor and announced funding for a new project in Ukraine;
Finally, in 2010, the Harper government reorganized its funding of Canadian NGOs, increasing its control over their geographic and sectoral priorities and began to defund well-respected development NGOs that had publicly criticized Conservative policies and practices, including KAIROS, Alternatives, the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, the Mennonite Central Committee, and Development and Peace (see Brown 2012). Beginning in 2012, the Canadian Revenue Authority began auditing a number of non-profit organizations, including development NGOs, that were critical of the Conservative government (Beeby 2014). These measures are widely interpreted as attempts to silence dissent. In a similar vein, the Harper government also closed two development-related think tanks/research organizations that operated independently but relied heavily on government funds: Rights & Democracy in 2012 and the North-South Institute in 2014.

Domestic political considerations, including electoral calculations, may burnish a governing party’s image and increase its chances of re-election, but they hamper aid effectiveness by introducing and even prioritizing non-development-related concerns. The politicized “branding” of development assistance (e.g., countries and regions of concentration, themes of focus, special initiatives) also makes it more likely that they will be abandoned when a new party assumes power, thereby increasing harmful aid volatility and unpredictability.

Conclusion

Van der Veen’s seven motivations provide a useful framework with which to analyze the goals of Canadian “development interventions” and their evolution. There is, however, no simple distinction to be made between Liberal and Conservative governments. After all, most foreign aid programs continue, regardless of who is in power; the changes are mainly in the framing of new initiatives. Moreover, successive Canadian governments, especially Harper’s, have lacked a clear vision or overarching policy for development (Bülles and Kindornay 2013).

Nonetheless, certain patterns emerge: Martin and Harper (until Canada pulled out of a combat role in Afghanistan) placed greater emphasis on security as a foreign aid frame than did Chrétien, reflecting changes in the international security environment. Under Harper, Canada has decreased its use of aid to achieve already weak ideational goals, namely obligation/duty, self-affirmation/reputation and power/influence, with the notable exception of MNCH (which may prove ineffective in reaching those goals), despite frequent Canadian government claims of international leadership. Enlightened self-interest has also declined. By way of contrast, the Harper government has increasingly emphasized two material goals, economic self-interest and humanitarianism, at the rhetorical level and as evidenced by some aid allocation data.

Of these trends, only the recent decline in security considerations and, more importantly, the increased emphasis on humanitarian motives can be linked to improved aid effectiveness. However, the latter is undermined by the marked new prioritization of commercial interests that stands out starkly as

3) Brown also announced new assistance to Ukraine at a “roundtable” with local Conservative MP Kelly Block and the Ukrainian diaspora in Saskatoon; 4) Alice Wong, Minister of State for Seniors, announced new humanitarian assistance to the Philippines at a Filipino community event in Vancouver; 5) Minister of Finance Joe Oliver announced new assistance to the Caribbean at the Caribana Toronto Festival; 6) Conservative MP Peter Goldring announced new food assistance to Somalia at a public event with the Somali community in Edmonton; and 7) Brown co-hosted four separate, local “roundtables” with Southern Ontario Conservative MPs Peter Braid, Brad Butt, Susan Truppe and Mike Wallace (DFATD 2014). The decision to list the Philippines as a country of focus in 2014 can also be interpreted in the light of electoral calculations. Still, it possible that these meetings were used to leverage diasporic support for the Conservative Party without necessarily motivating the aid allocation decisions.
a recent Conservative motivation. CIDA’s absorption into DFATD is likely to increase the prominence of Canadian commercial interests in Canadian aid programs, potentially via a whole-of-government approach. Finally, an examination of a final motivation—a “hidden” master frame that is not part of van der Veen’s framework—reveals how domestic political interests can undercut even the most altruistic of goals.

As is the case for military interventions, development interventions have less of an impact in development when a country tries to go it alone. To be more effective, Canadian aid should focus more on working with development partners—both donors and recipients—for long-term objectives, rather than branding short-term initiatives that play to the domestic audience. It should also prioritize poverty reduction in developing countries as its primary goal, as mandated by Canadian law. Using aid for non-development purposes hampers its ability to attain development objectives, and often fails to achieve its other goals as well, be they material or ideational. Emphasizing altruism (both humanitarian motives and the idea of a duty or obligation), however, risks reducing support for foreign aid among non-development actors and, as argued in a previous volume of Canada Among Nations, could therefore jeopardize aid budgets (Brown 2008). Nonetheless, altruistic and self-interested goals can be compatible, especially in promoting global public goods out of “enlightened self-interest”. Reducing and even eliminating poverty around the world is clearly a global public good that would also benefit Canada in myriad ways.

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